Hitler – History Learning Academy

What is Authoritarianism?

Concepts have histories. They appear at specific times, change meanings at times, and disappear sometimes. Adam Przewarski

For a political system that affects the lives of so many, authoritarianism remains a surprisingly fuzzy concept. Ruth Ben-Ghiat

In the introduction to our series on authoritarian tactics, we noted how a significant increase in global authoritarianism since 1990 has spurned the publication of numerous books, articles, and podcasts that focus on authoritarianism past and present. Many of these contributions warn of authoritarian’s danger to liberal democracies and remind us of the dangers of past autocratic leaders like Mussolini, Stalin and Hitler.

But what is authoritarianism? How does it differ from democracy, totalitarianism, and other forms of government? Are there different versions of authoritarianism? If so, what discernible traits do they share? This series of blogs focuses on “authoritarian tactics,” but it is worthwhile to begin by exploring how people have defined authoritarianism. This blog will explore how scholars have contrasted authoritarianism with democracy and totalitarianism. We also investigate how modern scholars have traced how post-19th-century authoritarianism evolved from the early communist and fascist regimes to various military coups and finally to the 1990s and beyond with what scholars call the “new authoritarianism.”

Authoritarianism: A Relatively New Term.

As political scientist Adam Przewarski writes, “Concepts have histories.” (17). Political terms such as democracy, monarchy, dynasty, and communism have existed for centuries. “Authoritarianism” is relatively new, initially conceived as a regime distinct from “totalitarianism,” another term created in the 20^th century to describe the regimes of Stalin’s Soviet Union, Hitler’s Germany and, for some, Mussolini’s Italy. (Przewarski,18) These totalitarian states eventually faltered. However, commentators continued to use authoritarianism to describe various regimes in the latter half of the 20^th century and the beginning of the 21^st, ranging from Franco’s Spain to Muammar Gaddafi’s Libya and Augusto Pinochet Ugart’s Chile, who achieved power through military coups to democratically elected Viktor Orban in Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey Russia’s Vladimir Putin.

Do these regimes have enough similarities to be collectively defined as “authoritarianism”? One consistent claim among scholars is that authoritarianism is anti-democratic. We will begin here.

Authoritarianism as “Anti-Democratic”

Commentators frequently contrast authoritarianism with democracy, another problematic term. The notion of a government by the people misleads in the sense that not all people actively participate in politics. Few do. Representative democracy, whereby people elect officials to rule on their behalf, is closer to reality in countries claiming to be democratic but remains lofty as many peoples’ interests are readily neglected. In various cases, government “by the people” has been delimited by discriminations of race, gender and class. Athenian democracy, for instance, involved public debate and consent but excluded, among others, women and slaves. Most Western democracies, such as Canada and the United States, did not extend voting rights to women until after World War One. These days, the financial backing of electoral candidates and gerrymandering undermine equal public involvement and influence. Philosopher Peter Cave notes that contemporary democracies “are usually oriented to professional politicians competing for votes to become the people’s representative.” (59). He adds that financial support and charisma play big roles in the “public’s careful scrutiny of policy platforms.” ( 59)

Still, scholars use democracy or principles of democracy as counterpoints to authoritarianism. Noting how definitions of democracy have changed since antiquity, Przeworski writes that “these days” democracy means “a system where power is exerted in the name of and on behalf of the people by the process of elections that also allow them to vote out an incumbent (e.g. an elected President or Prime Minister). In other words, democracy is essentially “rule by consent” as legitimized by free and fair elections.

This notion of “public consent” is central to definitions of authoritarianism. For instance, the Dictionary of Political Thought describes authoritarianism as “The advocacy of government based on an established system of authority rather than on explicit or tacit consent.” (Scruton 32). The Chamber’s Dictionary of World History offers a more substantial definition, defining authoritarianism as

A form of government advocating such government is the opposite of democracy in that the consent of society to rulers and their decisions is not necessary. Voting and discussion are not usually employed except to give the government the appearance of democratic legitimacy, and such arrangements remain firmly under the control of the rulers. Authoritarian rulers draw their authority from what are claimed to be special qualities of a religious, nationalistic, or ideological nature, which are used to justify their dispensing with constitutional restrictions. Their rule, however, relies heavily upon coercion. (64)

This Chamber’s definition also focuses on consent, noting that authoritarian regimes do not embrace “democratic practices” such as voting and open discussion but sometimes allow them to “give the appearance of legitimacy.” Authoritarian authority also stems from sources other than public consent, such as religion (the Papal theocracies of the Holy Roman Empire, post-1979 Iran), nationalism (Russia’s Putin), and ideology (Lenin or Mao and their brands of communism). These sources of authority transcend constitutional restrictions in the name of the greater good of the people (e.g., the nation) and allow governments to forgo public consent and consolidate political power.

Political scientists, historians and journalists elaborate on these general descriptions of authoritarianism as “anti-democratic.” Besides public consent, they refer to democratic qualities such as pluralism, freedom of expression and limits on executive power. Political scientist Dr. Martha Crone defines authoritarian regimes by the “absence” of democratic characteristics, namely universal suffrage, free and fair elections, free competition of political parties, independent judiciary, freedom of press, speech, assembly, and religion. Journalist and historian Annie Applebaum refers to authoritarianism’s anti-pluralist mindset. She writes, “It is suspicious of people with different ideas. It is allergic to fierce debates. Whether those who have it derive their politics from Marxism or nationalism is irrelevant; it is a frame of mind, not a set of ideas.” (16) This frame of mind, as Applebaum puts it, encourages public conformity to government directives while discouraging dissent.

One of the more notable efforts to define authoritarianism hails from Yale political scientist Juan Jose Linz (1926 -2013). Like Crone and Applebaum, he highlighted a limited political pluralism that constrains political alternatives (e.g. competing political parties) to the incumbent power. Linz also highlighted authoritarian legitimacy based on fear rather than a reason-based platform. Examples here include Chile’s Pinochet’s (1973-1990) fight against leftist forces and Vladimir Putin’s emphasis on the threat of “the West.” These fears often focus on a malicious threat but can also refer to economic problems or loss of social status of particular groups. Linz adds that authoritarian leaders have vague and shifting executive powers. A modern-day example would be Russia’s Putin, who won the election in 1990 but drastically increased his powers while exceeding the traditional two-term limit as we approach 2024.

It should be noted that Linz’s definition of authoritarianism focused on its anti-democratic nature and how it differed from totalitarianism. With that in mind, let us turn our attention to totalitarianism.

Authoritarianism as Distinct from Totalitarianism

All within the state, none outside the state, none against the state. Benito Mussolini.

So far, the definitions of authoritarianism focus on traits deemed anti-democratic. However, totalitarian regimes also have these antidemocratic qualities. So, why identify a regime as authoritarian rather than totalitarian? Is there an essential difference? As Adam Przewarski writes, “We need to ask if there is something specific to authoritarianism that distinguishes it as a type of dictatorship, other than a watered-down totalitarianism that would make either term “redundant.” (19).

Before focusing on distinguishing features, we should explore what scholars mean by totalitarianism. One place to begin is Hannah Arendt (1906-1975), who focusedon Nazi Germany (1933-1945) and Stalin’s Soviet Union, particularly from the great purges of 1927 and 28 to the Soviet leader’s death in 1953. Arendt identified various characteristics that defined these polities as totalitarian. One was totalitarianism’s anti-pluralism, which relegates everyone as part of a political mass under the control of a centralized power. Here, class and other differences are erased to favour one identity, and citizens are subservient to the state. Moreover, there is no separation of public and private. The state controls all facets of life. As Marvin Perry writes, “The party-state determines what people should believe, what values they should hold. There is no room for individual thinking, private moral judgement or individual concerns – no natural rights, civil liberties that the state must respect.” (767)

Totalitarianism also aligns with an ideology or “absolute” law. For Lenin and subsequent Russian leaders, Marx’s law of history dictated the eventual collapse of capitalism and the creation of classless societies. In Nazi Germany, the ideology was grounded in “nature”; the eugenics-informed racial theories that saw a superior Aryan race winning the historical racial struggle against “inferior races” such as Jews, blacks, and Slavic peoples. For both regimes, these “inevitable” historical forces justified the state’s drastic and brutal efforts to consolidate its power and quash dissent. Accordingly, Nazi Germany claimed the imprisonment and extermination of certain people accorded with the natural order of things. Stalin justified his purges in line with a historical determinism that led to a classless society. In short, ideology informs a grand narrative that justifies state actions.

In totalitarian regimes, these “inevitable” laws are guided by an “infallible” leader like Hitler or Stalin, whose cult of personality puts them beyond public criticism or restraints. They can act with virtual impunity as the state does their will, which includes mass terror to encourage conformity and punish “enemies of the state.” Hitler ordered mass murders and genocide, and Stalin’s purges of 1937 and 1938 saw millions of Soviet people arrested, sent to labour camps or executed. Show trials and public executions sent a strong message to potential dissidents.

Contemporary definitions of totalitarianism generally align with Arendt. For instance, philosopher Alan Ryan describes totalitarianism as

“a set of political phenomena that includes dictatorship; one-part rule; systematic violence against enemies, including but not limited to political dissidents; the use of state terror as an everyday instrument of government; the destruction or politicization of all institutions save those created by the ruling party; and the systematic blurring of the line between the public and the private; all this in the interests of securing the total control of a political elite over every aspect of life.” (912).

But how is this different from authoritarianism?

Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism: Is There a Difference?

Scholars have addressed this question by identifying distinctive totalitarian traits. According to Ryan and others, one difference is the totalitarian intrusion of every aspect of life, including private life. Alan Ryan writes that Fascism, for instance, was overtly totalitarian in demanding total loyalty to one’s country and deeply hostile to the liberal separation of private and public attachment.” (914). Political scientist Jerzy J. Wiater echoes Ryan, saying, “Totalitarian dictatorships – unlike the authoritarian one – try to extend their power to all aspects of life, making them part of politics.” (78) Totalitarian regimes achieved this in my ways, including mass surveillance and controlling education and speech. Stalin’s Soviet Union, for instance, controlled where people lived, what they consumed, who went to university and what they studied.

Scholars also point to totalitarian leaders’ virtually unbridled power that far exceeds that of authoritarian heads of state. Arendt noted that the totalitarian leader is not bound by any rule of law. In Nazi Germany, for instance, it was the will of the Fuher that ruled supreme. Jose Linz echoes this point, writing that totalitarian leaders are “unconstrained by laws and procedures,” whereas “authoritarian leaders work with a political system within formally ill-defined but quite predictable norms.” (Wiater 78) In short, leaders like Hitler and Stalin could act with impunity as there were no checks and balances on their power. So, while authoritarian regimes included limited pluralism (e.g., other political parties and oppositional media), totalitarian regimes did not allow any level of pluralism. Simply put, Stalin’s Russia and Hitler’s Germany did not tolerate any political competition or dissent.

Linz and others also noted that authoritarianism does not involve the elaborate ideologies of totalitarian regimes, nor do they usually “cultivate the cult of the leaders with quasi-religious overtones, making them secular versions of the prophets.” (Wiater 78) For instance, Stalin’s successors, like Khrushchev and Brezhnev, were powerful but did not possess the same cult of personality as Stalin. (Wiater, 78)

Lastly, scholars note that totalitarianism is a particular and rare political entity. For Arendt, only Nazi Germany and Stalin’s Soviet Union fit the criteria. Other scholars include Mao’s China, Mussolini’s Italy and Kim Il Sung’s Korea. So, there remains some debate about what distinguishes totalitarianism from authoritarianism. However, there seems to be a consensus that totalitarianism is unique in the leader’s unbridled power (unrestrained by the rule of law), the cult of personality, its control of public life, and its deterministic ideology (e.g. Nazism or Stalinist communism).

Old and New Authoritarianism.

While scholars note totalitarianism as a rarity, authoritarianism includes a broader base of regimes based on how they gain and consolidate power. Some identify two general categories: old authoritarianism and new authoritarianism. What is the difference between old and new? One focal point of contrast is how regimes gain and then maintain power. University of Michigan political scientist Erica Franz outlines the two authoritarian types in Authoritarianism: What Everybody Needs to Know (2018).

A regime is authoritarian if the executive achieves power through undemocratic means, this is any means besides direct, relatively free and fair elections (e.g. Cuba under Castro and his brother) or if the executive achieved power via a free and fair election but later changed the rules such that subsequent electoral competition (whether legislative or executive) was limited. (e.g. Turkey under Recep Erdogan). (92)

In short, old authoritarian regimes achieve power without democratic consent, usually via a military coup, and the new ones gain power through fair elections but compromise future elections to prolong power and erode checks and balances on executive power. Let us take a closer look at both options.

Old Authoritarianism

For old authoritarianism, “undemocratic mean” usually involves coups and revolutions from the likes of Lenin in Russia, Franco in Spain, Mao Zedong in China and Pinochet in Chile. None of these regimes were able to control private lives like the totalitarian regimes of Stalin or Hitler, and ideology did not necessarily guide their rule. However, these old authoritarian regimes used explicit coercion and violence to gain and consolidate power. According to political scientists Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, these coups happen in two fundamental ways. One way is when someone within the political and military establishment takes over the existing government institutions – a “top-down” movement. Franco and Pinochet, for instance, were military leaders who deposed and replaced the incumbent leadership with military force. In both cases, prominent military leaders took over the existing political and military institutions. The other is a social revolutionary coup. Parties lead this “bottom-up” movement from outside the political or military establishment. Mao Zedong and Fidel Castro gained power through guerilla warfare as leaders outside the political establishment.

New Authoritarianism

The “new” form of authoritarian regimes tends to refrain from violence as a tool of power. Instead, it achieves power through free and fair elections, consolidating power by weakening checks on its power. Scholars describe this process as “democratic backsliding,” which Erica Franz describes as the “changes in the formal political institutions and informal political practice that significantly reduce the capacity of citizens to make enforceable claims upon the government. It is essentially the erosion of democracy.” (Franz, 92) In short, these governments undermine, control, or abolish those institutions, groups or individuals who threaten to abbreviate their political tenure or power. Unlike totalitarian and some old authoritarian regimes, there are competing political parties, but new authoritarians strive to ensure they are not real threats to their power. A telling example is Vladimir Putin of Russia, who won his 1990 election but changed “the rules of the game” to ensure that elections would result in his win. Other contemporary leaders like Victor Orban in Hungary and Turkey’s Precep Erdogan have implemented changes to favour their victories – albeit more subtly than Putin.

Political scientists Steven Lewitsky and Lucan Way describe this as “competitive authoritarianism,” they define as “civilian regimes in which formal democratic institutions exist and are widely viewed as the primary means of gaining power but in which the incumbent’s abuse of the places them at a significant advantage vis a vis their opponent…competition is real but unfair.” (26, Przeworski) This definition would exclude Franco’s Spain and contemporary China, which do not utilize democratic institutions to justify their rule, but would include contemporary leaders such as Putin, Orban and Erdogan, who have won a series of elections.

Besides electoral manipulation, these new authoritarians take other measures by eroding institutional checks on executive power, such as the judiciary, the media and the Constitution. Victor Orban’s Fidesz party won a majority election in Hungary in 2010. A year later, his party made a constitutional amendment that allowed a majority government to appoint judges. As journalist Gideon Rachman points out, the “court was gradually packed with judges sympathetic to Orban and stripped of some of its review powers.” (95) Poland’s Law and Justice Party (2015-2023) violated the constitution by taking control of the public broadcaster and firing experienced presenters and journalists in favour of party sympathizers. (Applebaum, 5). They also purged the civil service. In all cases, these steps served to undermine checks on party power.

Conclusion

As historian Ruth Ben-Ghiat points out, “authoritarianism remains a surprisingly fuzzy concept.” Scholars have defined it in contrast to liberal democracies and totalitarianism and have identified old and new authoritarian versions, the latter being a less overtly oppressive system that retains elements of liberal democracies such as elections – fair or otherwise.

Another approach to understanding authoritarianism is to step away from a focus on definition and examine authoritarian methods. Paul Brooker describes this approach as “less interested in the tradition ‘who rules’ than in the wider question of ‘how do they rule?’ and particularly their methods of control.” (14) This approach has been taken up by scholars such as Ruth Ben-Ghiat who prefer to focus on authoritarian practices, or what some refer to as the “authoritarian playbook.” Such an approach allows us to identify, for instance, how regimes as diverse as Mussolini’s Italy and Orban’s Hungary identified enemies of the state to foster division, erode checks on executive power and prolong stays in power. In this spirit, we devote the subsequent blogs in this series to these authoritarian practices.

Our next blog in this series – The Authoritarian Playbook: An Overview

Sources

Applebaum, Annie. Twilight of Democracy: The Seductive Lure of Authoritarianism. Toronto: McLelland and Stewart, 2020.

Arendt, Hannah. The Origins of Totalitarianism. Cleveland: Meridin Books, 1958

Ben-Ghiat, Ruth. Strongmen: From Mussolini to the Present. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2020.

Bongiovanni, Bruno, and John Rugman. “Totalitarianism: The Word and the Thing.” Journal of Modern European History / Zeitschrift Für Moderne Europäische Geschichte / Revue d’histoire Européenne Contemporaine 3, no. 1 (2005): 5–17. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26265805.

Brooker, Paul. Non-Democratic Regimes: Theory, Government and Politics. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000.

Cave, Peter. The Big Think Book: Discover Philosophy Through 99 Perplexing Puzzles. London: One World Publications, 2015.

Davis, Kenneth. Strongman: The Rise and Fall of Democracy. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2020

Dikotter Frank. How to be a Dictator: The Cult of Personality in the Twentieth Century. New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2019.

Franz, Erica, Authoritarianism: What Everyone Needs to Know. New York: Oxford University Press, 2018.

Friedrich, Carl and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski. Totalitarianism Dictatorship and Autocracy. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965.

Glasius, Marlies. What authoritarianism is and is not: A practice perspective. International Affairs. 94. 515-533. 10.1093/ia/iiy060. 2018

Law, Diane. The Secret History of the Great Dictators. London: Magpie Books, 2006.

Kohn, Jerome. “Arendt’s Concept and Description of Totalitarianism.” Social Research 69, no. 2 (2002): 621–56. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40971564.

Levitsky, Steve and Lucan Way. Revolution and Dictatorship: The Violent Origins of Durable Authoritarianism. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2022.

Linz, Juan. Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes. Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner. 2000

Nisbet, Robert. Review of Arendt on Totalitarianism, by Hannah Arendt. The National Interest, no. 27 (1992): 85–91. http://www.jstor.org/stable/42896812.

Przeworski, Adam. “A Conceptual History of Political Regimes: Democracy, Dictatorship, and Authoritarianism.” New Authoritarianism: Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century, edited by Jerzy J. Wiatr, 1st ed., Verlag Barbara Budrich, 2019, pp. 17–36. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvdf08xx.5. Accessed 23 Oct. 2023.

Scruton, Robert. Dictionary of Political Thought. London: The MacMillan Press, 1982.

Stanley, Jason. How Fascism Works: The Politics of Us and Them. New York: Random House, 2018.

Wiatr, Jerzy J. “Autocratic Leaders in Modern Times.” Political Leadership Between Democracy and Authoritarianism: Comparative and Historical Perspectives, 1st ed., Verlag Barbara Budrich, 2022, pp. 74–116. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv27tctmb.8. Accessed 23 Oct. 2023.

Authoritarian Practices: Introduction

We do not argue with those who disagree with us, we destroy them. Benito Mussolini

A growing number of astute political observers cite a global trend of authoritarianism since 1990. Countries like Russia, Turkey, India, Hungary and even the United States erode or effectively abolish democratic institutions and freedoms. These observers – mainly scholars and journalists – situate authoritarianism in a historical context, often beginning with the Fascist leaders of the early 20^th century – Italy’s Benito Mussolini and Nazi Germany’s Adolf Hitler and the Communist regimes of Stalin’s Russia and Mao Zedong in China.

But what is authoritarianism? How does it take hold of a polity? How do authoritarian leaders gain and keep power? Some people refer to these practices as an “Authoritarian playbook.” Of course, authoritarianism is not uniform. It varies in degrees of centralized power and brutality from Hitler and Stalin to Trump’s sustained efforts to erode democracy in the United States. However, authoritarian leaders often borrow techniques from each other. For instance, Hitler’s propaganda minister, Joseph Goebbels, travelled to Italy to study Mussolini’s methods to apply them to a rising Nazi Germany. Donald Trump and his supporters echoed Victor Orban of Hungary’s conspiracy of billionaire George Soros as the leftist boogeyman and adapted Make Hungary Great Again to his MAGA mantra. As scholars like Ruth Ben-Ghiat and Jason Stanley point out, contemporary authoritarian tactics are not new but inspired by past authoritarian leaders.

Over the next year, we will publish blogs on authoritarian practices that some call the Authoritarian Playbook. All writings will focus on the broader context, beginning with the post-WWI years, to explore similarities and crucial differences.

Here is the list of upcoming topics.

What is Authoritarianism? Historical interpretations.
The Authoritarian Playbook: An Overview of Authoritarian Tactics
The National Myth (Mythical Past)
Us vs. Them: Fostering Division and Repression
Attacking the Truth: Eroding Facts and Media credibility
Re-education. Undermining Intellectual Challenges
Undermining Checks and Balances (e.g. Judiciaries)
Cult of Personality – “The Strongman”
Corrupters and Enablers
Using Violence
Resistance and Downfall

Stay tuned for our first blog on authoritarianism – What is Authoritarianism? Historical interpretations.

Bibliography

Ben-Ghiat, Ruth. Strongmen, From Mussolini to the Present. New York: W.W. Norton and Company Inc., 2020.

Davis, Kenneth. Strongman: The Rise and Fall of Democracy. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2020

Glasius, Marlies. (2018). What authoritarianism is and is not: A practice perspective. International Affairs. 94. 515-533. 10.1093/ia/iiy060.

Stanley, Jason. How Fascism Works: The Politics of Us and Them. New York: Random House, 2018.

Germans and the Nazi Persecutions (1933-45): Coercion or Complicity?

Complicity. Partnership in a crime or wrongdoing.

Coercion. Persuade or restrain (an unwilling person) by force or threat of punishment.

Introduction. Adolf Hitler and the National Socialist Party gained power in 1933 and would govern Germany until the end of World War Two (1945). By 1934, his Nazi government had become a dictatorship, with Hitler as the Fuhrer. With bolstered state powers, they persecuted “enemies of Germany,” such as Communist Party members, Social Democrats, and labour groups. Hitler also targeted those deemed unfit according to the Nazi racial hygiene agenda – people of colour, gypsies, criminals, the mentally and physically challenged and above all, Jews. The Nazis dismissed people from their jobs, confiscated property, locked people in prisons and concentration camps, sterilized the “unfit,” and executed millions.

A Debate. How was it possible for the Nazis to persecute various groups – especially- Jews without significant resistance from German citizens? Many historians have addressed this question. Some scholars argue that German citizens complied with and supported and even initiated the persecution and slaughter of Jews and other groups. Others insist that most Germans disapproved of Nazi domestic persecution and terror but did not speak out for fear of Nazi retribution, including loss of property or career, imprisonment, and execution.

Nazi Terror and Retribution. When Hitler and the National Socialist Party took power in 1933, they began centralizing control of Germany. According to Richard Evans, the main instrument of coercion was the law. The Nazis passed laws and decrees that broadened what constituted treason and people’s options for freedom of expression. For instance, it became legal to ridicule Hitler, to make derogatory remarks against the Nazi party, or to “discuss alternatives to the political status quo.” (Evans,101)

Speaking out against Nazi policies or assisting the persecuted could result in severe retribution. In Why? Explaining the Holocaust (2017), Peter Hayes points out that “overt assistance to Jews constituted sabotage punishable by death” and cites the example of Nazi Anton Schmidt, who facilitated the escape of at least 100 Jews after witnessing the execution of Jewish infants. After being exposed, he was court-martialed and executed. (145-146).

Surveillance and intimidation proved effective deterrents to dissent. The Nazi secret police (Gestapo) did not have many men at their disposal but still “infiltrated people’s lives – directly, indirectly and psychologically.” (Childress, 319). Gestapo agents performed late-night arrests and interrogations. Germans were encouraged to report transgressions of Nazi law by their peers, neighbours and even family. Those charged faced a dubious legal process through what Richard Evans describes as a “whole system of regional Special Courts, crowned by the National People’s Court, the Volkgerichlen, was created to implement these and similar laws. (Evans, 101)

These historians argue that the Nazis organized an effective program of intimidation and coercion that effectively discouraged Germans from resisting the Nazi racial hygiene program.

Citizen Complicity. Other scholars believe such interpretations overstate the extent of Nazi control while neglecting the willingness of German citizens to facilitate and even initiate the persecutions. In Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust (1997), Daniel Goldhagen acknowledges Nazi government coercion but argues that the main driving force behind the Holocaust was deep-seated, specifically German antisemitism.

Goldhagen relates a story about Captain Wolfgang Hoffman, “a zealous executioner of Jews” who led “ordinary men” to slaughter tens of thousands of Jews in Poland. (3). Hoffman, he points out, refused to sign a declaration that his group would not plunder and steal from the persecuted Jews. Why did he refuse? Hoffman took offence that he and the men under his charge would steal. Besides the irony that Hoffman enthusiastically killed people, Goldhagen points out that Hoffman was not punished for refusing a direct order. In order words, Hoffman had a choice. By extension, his persecution of Jews came not from fear of retribution but from personal conviction—a willing executioner.

Goldhagen goes on to argue that historians have focused on the leaders of the Nazi regime while neglecting people like Hoffman who facilitated the execution not from fear of Nazi retribution but out of a conviction that stemmed from “a particular type of antisemitism that led them to conclude that the Jews ought to die.”

Goldhagen’s thesis hinges on pervasive German-specific antisemitism – a point of controversy among historians. In Hitler and the Holocaust (2001), Robert S. Wistrich argues that Goldhagen overstates the role of German eliminationist antisemitism in the Holocaust. Germans certainly facilitated the killings, but this didn’t stem from a longstanding eliminationist mindset in the mid 19^th century. Before Hitler, Wistrich argues, “racist antisemitism had not made great inroads in Germany” and was “still a state based on the rule of law, where Jews achieved remarkable economic success, were well integrated into society, and enjoyed equal rights.” (4)

Selective Nazi Terror. In Nazi Terror: The Gestapo, Jews and Ordinary Germans (1999), Eric Johnson agrees with Goldhagen that many ordinary Germans willingly facilitated terror campaigns, persecutions and genocide. He also acknowledges the role of Nazi coercion but disagrees with Evans on the extent of Nazi coercion. He argues that Hitler’s government did not terrorize most Germans but instead focused the terror against “enemies of the state” – especially Jews. Most German citizens were not directly impacted by Nazi terror and “enjoyed considerable space to vent their everyday frustration with Nazi policies and leaders without inordinate fear of arrest or prosecution. (19)

Richard Evans disagrees with Johnson’s presentation of selective Nazi coercion and persecution. Nazi violence focused more on particular groups but “operated across the board.”(199). In 1933-4, for instance, the Nazis targeted the political leaders of the Social Democratic and Communist parties, such as Social Democrat Johann Steller, who “was tortured to death. (93). Together, Evans notes, “the Social Democrats and Communists had won 131 million votes in the Reichstag election of 1932.” (94). “Hardly,” he points out, “members of a despised minority of social outcasts.”(94)

Self Interest and Opportunism Another historian who does not see antisemitism as the main factor in Holocaust is Joseph D. Bendersky. In A Concise History of Nazi Germany (2014), Bendersky argues that “the Jewish question had not been important to most German” who were more concerned with “moral degeneracy, crime, political subversion, and public order.” (139). Accordingly, the persecution of Communists, sexual deviants, and violent criminals received public support. He places more weight on other factors, including economic self-interest and the “terror of the police state.” (141) Regarding self-interest, Bendersky notes how although a “Large segment” of German were shocked by Nazi violence, many opportunistically filled the Jewish vacancies in various professions, civil service positions, and businesses as Nazis pushed Jews out of their jobs. “Profit at the expense of the Jews was a temptation too many could not resist.” (139). Like Evans and Hayes, he adds that the Nazi use of terror deterred resistance and many who persisted paid the price. “Countless individuals,” Bendersky writes, paid with their lives for speaking out or for attempting to save others from Nazi tyranny. (141)

Conclusion. The role of German citizens in Nazi persecution, and particularly the Holocaust, remains a contentious topic and one that scholars will grapple with for many years to come. Hitler’s Nazi regime indeed used terror and reward to encourage German complicity. Some Germans, of course, engaged in the persecutions of “German enemies” with horrific enthusiasm. The longstanding question remains. Which factored more, coercion or complicity?

Bibliography

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Wistrich, Robert. Who’s Who in Nazi Germany. London, 1995.

Six Reasons to Study History

At some point, in elementary and high school, you took a history course. The curriculum focused on your country or continent (e.g. European History). Being from Canada, I learned about the Fur Trade, French and English competition in North America, national and provincial politics, and a smattering of other topics.

However, no one told us why we studied history. We didn’t learn how studying the past could benefit us, enrich our lives and teach us skills to help us navigate careers and even our lives. School teachers omitted the most fundamental question: Why study history?

Perhaps addressing this fundamental question would evoke more interest and appreciation in the subject

Historians have written extensively on the importance of understanding the past. After careful consideration, we have distilled these explanations into six reasons to study history.

Understand the Present. “Everything,” Jules Benjamin writes, “that exists in the present has come out of the past.” Our material life, for instance, grew out of past developments. The Agricultural Revolution that began some 10,000 years led to farming, rising populations, and, as historians have recently pointed out, much of the environmental damage we contend with today. Technologies have changed our lives – papermaking in China, the Gutenberg printing press, irrigation, gunpower, and computers, to name a few. Politically, our borders, governing bodies, and values come out of the past. Democracy, a Greek concept, hails back thousands of years, as does Confucianism, a significant factor in Chinese politics and culture. Modern religious conflicts between the monotheistic religions – Judaism, Christianity, and Islam – can be better understood by delving into the past. Current issues around race, gender, class and many others can be traced back in time.

Understand Causation. As Peter Stearns and Marcus Collins write, causation is the “factors which promoted a change in the first place.” (33). Not surprisingly, causation is a contentious matter among historians. Regarding the decline of the Roman Empire, some historians emphasize external factors such as the growing determination and strength of the barbarians. In contrast, others have devoted more attention to internal factors such as corruption and financial mismanagement. Whatever their positions, contemporary historians tend to agree that “most major developments respond to several factors, that is, multiple causations (34). Lessons about causation allow us to analyze current events with a more critical eye. Conspiracy theorists, for instance, who point to Bill Gates or a secret New Order as the orchestraters of the COVID-19 pandemic, would be well served to study history and causation more carefully. A recommended read – David Hackett Fischer’s Historical Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought.

Situate Events in Context. Intrinsically linked to causation is context. Context, in short, is the set of conditions in which events unfold. Historians tell us that Serbian nationalist Gavrilo Princip’s assassination of Austria-Hungary’s Archduke Franz Ferdinand sparked the beginning of World War I. They also rightly assert we need to explore the conditions in which Princip shot the Archduke – Great Power rivalries, militarism, nationalism, and various other factors came into play – to develop a fuller understanding of what happened. Understanding context helps us understand events (past and present) in sophisticated rather than superficial ways.

Challenge Abuses of History. Somepeople use history to further their agendas. Hitler and the Nazis rewrote history to justify their actions. Among other past abuses, they identified a longstanding Jewish conspiracy to undermine German society while espousing their contrived record of Aryan accomplishment and superiority. We need to challenge these abuses. As Margaret McMillan writes, “Politicians and other leaders too often get away with misusing or abusing history for their own ends because the rest of us do not know enough to challenge them. (36) This is especially relevant now, in what some call the age of disinformation. Politicians like Donald Trump casually refer to a great America of the past or fabricates “facts” about election fraud or other issues to reinforce his position. Historical training, as Stearns and Collins point out, “helps people to handle different kinds of evidence and to sort fact from opinion and disinformation.” (9). After all, who wants to be lead astray by those informed by partisanship, opportunism, or lazy thinking?

Pleasure. The love of learning!Some people approach history simply for the joy of learning more about the past – tracing family trees, visiting exotic locations and past eras can be exhilarating and enriching.

Practical Skills. People often overlook the practical skills involved in historical study. You learn how to research topics and interpret sources for their biases and background. In the process, you assess various viewpoints and interpretations. Communicating your views helps you develop critical thinking, organization, as well as your writing and verbal skills. Universities, for instance, apply these skills to a variety of topics. Entrepreneurs and business students examine case studies of businesses past and present to gain insights into how companies succeed and fail. Law schools refer to pasts decisions – precedence

There are many other reasons to study history that we will explore in future blogs. John Tosh writes that “historical education achieves a number of goals at once: it trains the mind, enlarges the sympathies and provides a much-needed perspective on some of the most pressing problems of our time. (35) These factors, coupled with the pure pleasure of learning about our past, offer poignant reasons to explore history.

Enjoy!

Selected Bibliography.

Benjamin, Jules R. A Student’s Guide to History. Boston: St. Martins, 2001.

Collins, Marc and Peter N. Stearns. Why Study History? London: London Publishing Partnership, 2020.

Fischer, David Hackett. Historians’ Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought. New York: Harper Perennial, 1970.

McMillan, Margaret. The Uses and Abuses of History. Toronto: Penguin Group, 2008.

Stearns, Peter N. et al. Knowing, Teaching, and Learning History. New York: New York University Press, 2000.

Tosh, John. The Pursuit of History: Aims, Methods and New Directions in the Study of Modern History. Essex: Pearson Education Limited, 1999.

Wineberg, Sam. Historical Thinking and Other Unnatural Acts. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2001.