Category Archives: 20th Century

What is Authoritarianism?  

 

Concepts have histories. They appear at specific times, change meanings at times, and disappear sometimes. Adam Przewarski

 For a political system that affects the lives of so many, authoritarianism remains a surprisingly fuzzy concept. Ruth Ben-Ghiat

In the introduction to our series on authoritarian tactics, we noted how a significant increase in global authoritarianism since 1990 has spurned the publication of numerous books, articles, and podcasts that focus on authoritarianism past and present.  Many of these contributions warn of authoritarian’s danger to liberal democracies and remind us of the dangers of past autocratic leaders like Mussolini, Stalin and Hitler.

But what is authoritarianism?  How does it differ from democracy, totalitarianism, and other forms of government?  Are there different versions of authoritarianism? If so, what discernible traits do they share?  This series of blogs focuses on “authoritarian tactics,” but it is worthwhile to begin by exploring how people have defined authoritarianism.  This blog will explore how scholars have contrasted authoritarianism with democracy and totalitarianism.  We also investigate how modern scholars have traced how post-19th-century authoritarianism evolved from the early communist and fascist regimes to various military coups and finally to the 1990s and beyond with what scholars call the “new authoritarianism.” 

Authoritarianism: A Relatively New Term. 

As political scientist Adam Przewarski writes, “Concepts have histories.” (17). Political terms such as democracy, monarchy, dynasty, and communism have existed for centuries.  “Authoritarianism” is relatively new, initially conceived as a regime distinct from “totalitarianism,” another term created in the 20th century to describe the regimes of Stalin’s Soviet Union, Hitler’s Germany and, for some, Mussolini’s Italy. (Przewarski,18) These totalitarian states eventually faltered. However, commentators continued to use authoritarianism to describe various regimes in the latter half of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st, ranging from Franco’s Spain to Muammar Gaddafi’s Libya and Augusto Pinochet Ugart’s Chile, who achieved power through military coups to democratically elected Viktor Orban in Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey Russia’s Vladimir Putin.

Do these regimes have enough similarities to be collectively defined as “authoritarianism”? One consistent claim among scholars is that authoritarianism is anti-democratic.  We will begin here.

Authoritarianism as “Anti-Democratic”

Commentators frequently contrast authoritarianism with democracy, another problematic term.  The notion of a government by the people misleads in the sense that not all people actively participate in politics. Few do. Representative democracy, whereby people elect officials to rule on their behalf, is closer to reality in countries claiming to be democratic but remains lofty as many peoples’ interests are readily neglected. In various cases, government “by the people” has been delimited by discriminations of race, gender and class.  Athenian democracy, for instance, involved public debate and consent but excluded, among others, women and slaves.  Most Western democracies, such as Canada and the United States, did not extend voting rights to women until after World War One. These days, the financial backing of electoral candidates and gerrymandering undermine equal public involvement and influence.   Philosopher Peter Cave notes that contemporary democracies “are usually oriented to professional politicians competing for votes to become the people’s representative.” (59). He adds that financial support and charisma play big roles in the “public’s careful scrutiny of policy platforms.” ( 59)

Still, scholars use democracy or principles of democracy as counterpoints to authoritarianism. Noting how definitions of democracy have changed since antiquity, Przeworski writes that “these days” democracy means “a system where power is exerted in the name of and on behalf of the people by the process of elections that also allow them to vote out an incumbent (e.g. an elected President or Prime Minister).   In other words, democracy is essentially “rule by consent” as legitimized by free and fair elections.  

This notion of “public consent” is central to definitions of authoritarianism.   For instance, the Dictionary of Political Thought describes authoritarianism as “The advocacy of government based on an established system of authority rather than on explicit or tacit consent.” (Scruton 32).  The Chamber’s Dictionary of World History offers a more substantial definition, defining authoritarianism as

A form of government advocating such government is the opposite of democracy in that the consent of society to rulers and their decisions is not necessary. Voting and discussion are not usually employed except to give the government the appearance of democratic legitimacy, and such arrangements remain firmly under the control of the rulers.  Authoritarian rulers draw their authority from what are claimed to be special qualities of a religious, nationalistic, or ideological nature, which are used to justify their dispensing with constitutional restrictions. Their rule, however, relies heavily upon coercion. (64)   

This Chamber’s definition also focuses on consent, noting that authoritarian regimes do not embrace “democratic practices” such as voting and open discussion but sometimes allow them to “give the appearance of legitimacy.”  Authoritarian authority also stems from sources other than public consent, such as religion (the Papal theocracies of the Holy Roman Empire, post-1979 Iran), nationalism (Russia’s Putin), and ideology (Lenin or Mao and their brands of communism). These sources of authority transcend constitutional restrictions in the name of the greater good of the people (e.g., the nation) and allow governments to forgo public consent and consolidate political power.

Political scientists, historians and journalists elaborate on these general descriptions of authoritarianism as “anti-democratic.” Besides public consent, they refer to democratic qualities such as pluralism, freedom of expression and limits on executive power. Political scientist Dr. Martha Crone defines authoritarian regimes by the “absence” of democratic characteristics, namely universal suffrage, free and fair elections, free competition of political parties, independent judiciary, freedom of press, speech, assembly, and religion.  Journalist and historian Annie Applebaum refers to authoritarianism’s anti-pluralist mindset. She writes, “It is suspicious of people with different ideas. It is allergic to fierce debates. Whether those who have it derive their politics from Marxism or nationalism is irrelevant; it is a frame of mind, not a set of ideas.”  (16)  This frame of mind, as Applebaum puts it, encourages public conformity to government directives while discouraging dissent.

One of the more notable efforts to define authoritarianism hails from Yale political scientist Juan Jose Linz (1926 -2013).    Like Crone and Applebaum, he highlighted a limited political pluralism that constrains political alternatives (e.g. competing political parties) to the incumbent power.  Linz also highlighted authoritarian legitimacy based on fear rather than a reason-based platform.  Examples here include Chile’s Pinochet’s  (1973-1990) fight against leftist forces and Vladimir Putin’s emphasis on the threat of “the West.”  These fears often focus on a malicious threat but can also refer to economic problems or loss of social status of particular groups.  Linz adds that authoritarian leaders have vague and shifting executive powers.  A modern-day example would be Russia’s Putin, who won the election in 1990 but drastically increased his powers while exceeding the traditional two-term limit as we approach 2024.    

It should be noted that Linz’s definition of authoritarianism focused on its anti-democratic nature and how it differed from totalitarianism.  With that in mind, let us turn our attention to totalitarianism.   

Authoritarianism as Distinct from Totalitarianism

All within the state, none outside the state, none against the state. Benito Mussolini.

So far, the definitions of authoritarianism focus on traits deemed anti-democratic.  However, totalitarian regimes also have these antidemocratic qualities.  So, why identify a regime as authoritarian rather than totalitarian?   Is there an essential difference?  As Adam Przewarski writes, “We need to ask if there is something specific to authoritarianism that distinguishes it as a type of dictatorship, other than a watered-down totalitarianism that would make either term “redundant.” (19).

Before focusing on distinguishing features, we should explore what scholars mean by totalitarianism.  One place to begin is Hannah Arendt (1906-1975), who focusedon Nazi Germany (1933-1945) and Stalin’s Soviet Union, particularly from the great purges of 1927 and 28 to the Soviet leader’s death in 1953. Arendt identified various characteristics that defined these polities as totalitarian.  One was totalitarianism’s anti-pluralism, which relegates everyone as part of a political mass under the control of a centralized power.  Here, class and other differences are erased to favour one identity, and citizens are subservient to the state. Moreover, there is no separation of public and private. The state controls all facets of life.  As Marvin Perry writes, “The party-state determines what people should believe, what values they should hold.  There is no room for individual thinking, private moral judgement or individual concerns – no natural rights, civil liberties that the state must respect.” (767)

Totalitarianism also aligns with an ideology or “absolute” law.  For Lenin and subsequent Russian leaders, Marx’s law of history dictated the eventual collapse of capitalism and the creation of classless societies.  In Nazi Germany, the ideology was grounded in “nature”; the eugenics-informed racial theories that saw a superior Aryan race winning the historical racial struggle against “inferior races” such as Jews, blacks, and Slavic peoples.  For both regimes, these “inevitable” historical forces justified the state’s drastic and brutal efforts to consolidate its power and quash dissent. Accordingly, Nazi Germany claimed the imprisonment and extermination of certain people accorded with the natural order of things. Stalin justified his purges in line with a historical determinism that led to a classless society. In short, ideology informs a grand narrative that justifies state actions. 

In totalitarian regimes, these “inevitable” laws are guided by an “infallible” leader like Hitler or Stalin, whose cult of personality puts them beyond public criticism or restraints.  They can act with virtual impunity as the state does their will, which includes mass terror to encourage conformity and punish “enemies of the state.” Hitler ordered mass murders and genocide, and Stalin’s purges of 1937 and 1938 saw millions of Soviet people arrested, sent to labour camps or executed.   Show trials and public executions sent a strong message to potential dissidents.

Contemporary definitions of totalitarianism generally align with Arendt.  For instance, philosopher Alan Ryan describes totalitarianism as

“a set of political phenomena that includes dictatorship; one-part rule; systematic violence against enemies, including but not limited to political dissidents; the use of state terror as an everyday instrument of government; the destruction or politicization of all institutions save those created by the ruling party; and the systematic blurring of the line between the public and the private; all this in the interests of securing the total control of a political elite over every aspect of life.” (912).  

But how is this different from authoritarianism? 

Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism: Is There a Difference?

Scholars have addressed this question by identifying distinctive totalitarian traits. According to Ryan and others, one difference is the totalitarian intrusion of every aspect of life, including private life. Alan Ryan writes that Fascism, for instance, was overtly totalitarian in demanding total loyalty to one’s country and deeply hostile to the liberal separation of private and public attachment.” (914). Political scientist Jerzy J. Wiater echoes Ryan, saying, “Totalitarian dictatorships – unlike the authoritarian one – try to extend their power to all aspects of life, making them part of politics.” (78)  Totalitarian regimes achieved this in my ways, including mass surveillance and controlling education and speech.    Stalin’s Soviet Union, for instance, controlled where people lived, what they consumed, who went to university and what they studied. 

Scholars also point to totalitarian leaders’ virtually unbridled power that far exceeds that of authoritarian heads of state. Arendt noted that the totalitarian leader is not bound by any rule of law.  In Nazi Germany, for instance, it was the will of the Fuher that ruled supreme. Jose Linz echoes this point, writing that totalitarian leaders are “unconstrained by laws and procedures,” whereas “authoritarian leaders work with a political system within formally ill-defined but quite predictable norms.” (Wiater 78) In short, leaders like Hitler and Stalin could act with impunity as there were no checks and balances on their power.  So, while authoritarian regimes included limited pluralism (e.g., other political parties and oppositional media), totalitarian regimes did not allow any level of pluralism.  Simply put, Stalin’s Russia and Hitler’s Germany did not tolerate any political competition or dissent.    

Linz and others also noted that authoritarianism does not involve the elaborate ideologies of totalitarian regimes, nor do they usually “cultivate the cult of the leaders with quasi-religious overtones, making them secular versions of the prophets.” (Wiater 78) For instance, Stalin’s successors, like Khrushchev and Brezhnev, were powerful but did not possess the same cult of personality as Stalin. (Wiater, 78)    

Lastly, scholars note that totalitarianism is a particular and rare political entity.  For Arendt, only Nazi Germany and Stalin’s Soviet Union fit the criteria.  Other scholars include Mao’s China, Mussolini’s Italy and Kim Il Sung’s Korea.  So, there remains some debate about what distinguishes totalitarianism from authoritarianism. However, there seems to be a consensus that totalitarianism is unique in the leader’s unbridled power (unrestrained by the rule of law), the cult of personality, its control of public life, and its deterministic ideology (e.g. Nazism or Stalinist communism).  

Old and New Authoritarianism.

While scholars note totalitarianism as a rarity, authoritarianism includes a broader base of regimes based on how they gain and consolidate power.  Some identify two general categories: old authoritarianism and new authoritarianism.  What is the difference between old and new? One focal point of contrast is how regimes gain and then maintain power.  University of Michigan political scientist Erica Franz outlines the two authoritarian types in Authoritarianism: What Everybody Needs to Know (2018).

A regime is authoritarian if the executive achieves power through undemocratic means, this is any means besides direct, relatively free and fair elections (e.g. Cuba under Castro and his brother) or if the executive achieved power via a free and fair election but later changed the rules such that subsequent electoral competition (whether legislative or executive) was limited. (e.g. Turkey under Recep Erdogan). (92)

In short, old authoritarian regimes achieve power without democratic consent, usually via a military coup, and the new ones gain power through fair elections but compromise future elections to prolong power and erode checks and balances on executive power.  Let us take a closer look at both options.

Old Authoritarianism

For old authoritarianism, “undemocratic mean” usually involves coups and revolutions from the likes of Lenin in Russia, Franco in Spain, Mao Zedong in China and Pinochet in Chile. None of these regimes were able to control private lives like the totalitarian regimes of Stalin or Hitler, and ideology did not necessarily guide their rule.  However, these old authoritarian regimes used explicit coercion and violence to gain and consolidate power.  According to political scientists Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, these coups happen in two fundamental ways.  One way is when someone within the political and military establishment takes over the existing government institutions – a “top-down” movement. Franco and Pinochet, for instance, were military leaders who deposed and replaced the incumbent leadership with military force.  In both cases, prominent military leaders took over the existing political and military institutions.  The other is a social revolutionary coup. Parties lead this “bottom-up” movement from outside the political or military establishment.  Mao Zedong and Fidel Castro gained power through guerilla warfare as leaders outside the political establishment. 

New Authoritarianism

The “new” form of authoritarian regimes tends to refrain from violence as a tool of power. Instead, it achieves power through free and fair elections, consolidating power by weakening checks on its power.  Scholars describe this process as “democratic backsliding,” which Erica Franz describes as the “changes in the formal political institutions and informal political practice that significantly reduce the capacity of citizens to make enforceable claims upon the government. It is essentially the erosion of democracy.” (Franz, 92) In short, these governments undermine, control, or abolish those institutions, groups or individuals who threaten to abbreviate their political tenure or power.  Unlike totalitarian and some old authoritarian regimes, there are competing political parties, but new authoritarians strive to ensure they are not real threats to their power.  A telling example is Vladimir Putin of Russia, who won his 1990 election but changed “the rules of the game” to ensure that elections would result in his win.  Other contemporary leaders like Victor Orban in Hungary and Turkey’s Precep Erdogan have implemented changes to favour their victories – albeit more subtly than Putin. 

Political scientists Steven Lewitsky and Lucan Way describe this as “competitive authoritarianism,” they define as “civilian regimes in which formal democratic institutions exist and are widely viewed as the primary means of gaining power but in which the incumbent’s abuse of the places them at a significant advantage vis a vis their opponent…competition is real but unfair.” (26, Przeworski)  This definition would exclude Franco’s Spain and contemporary China, which do not utilize democratic institutions to justify their rule, but would include contemporary leaders such as Putin, Orban and Erdogan, who have won a series of elections.    

Besides electoral manipulation, these new authoritarians take other measures by eroding institutional checks on executive power, such as the judiciary, the media and the Constitution.  Victor Orban’s Fidesz party won a majority election in Hungary in 2010.  A year later, his party made a constitutional amendment that allowed a majority government to appoint judges.  As journalist Gideon Rachman points out, the “court was gradually packed with judges sympathetic to Orban and stripped of some of its review powers.” (95) Poland’s Law and Justice Party (2015-2023) violated the constitution by taking control of the public broadcaster and firing experienced presenters and journalists in favour of party sympathizers. (Applebaum, 5). They also purged the civil service.  In all cases, these steps served to undermine checks on party power.  

Conclusion

As historian Ruth Ben-Ghiat points out, “authoritarianism remains a surprisingly fuzzy concept.”  Scholars have defined it in contrast to liberal democracies and totalitarianism and have identified old and new authoritarian versions, the latter being a less overtly oppressive system that retains elements of liberal democracies such as elections – fair or otherwise. 

Another approach to understanding authoritarianism is to step away from a focus on definition and examine authoritarian methods.  Paul Brooker describes this approach as “less interested in the tradition ‘who rules’ than in the wider question of ‘how do they rule?’ and particularly their methods of control.” (14)  This approach has been taken up by scholars such as Ruth Ben-Ghiat who prefer to focus on authoritarian practices, or what some refer to as the “authoritarian playbook.”  Such an approach allows us to identify, for instance, how regimes as diverse as Mussolini’s Italy and Orban’s Hungary identified enemies of the state to foster division, erode checks on executive power and prolong stays in power.  In this spirit, we devote the subsequent blogs in this series to these authoritarian practices.   

Our next blog in this series – The Authoritarian Playbook: An Overview

Sources

Applebaum, Annie.  Twilight of Democracy: The Seductive Lure of Authoritarianism. Toronto: McLelland and Stewart, 2020.

Arendt, Hannah. The Origins of Totalitarianism. Cleveland: Meridin Books, 1958

Ben-Ghiat, Ruth. Strongmen: From Mussolini to the Present. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2020.  

Bongiovanni, Bruno, and John Rugman. “Totalitarianism: The Word and the Thing.” Journal of Modern European History / Zeitschrift Für Moderne Europäische Geschichte / Revue d’histoire Européenne Contemporaine 3, no. 1 (2005): 5–17. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26265805.

Brooker, Paul. Non-Democratic Regimes: Theory, Government and Politics. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000.

Cave, Peter. The Big Think Book: Discover Philosophy Through 99 Perplexing Puzzles. London: One World Publications, 2015. 

Davis, Kenneth. Strongman: The Rise and Fall of Democracy. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2020

Dikotter Frank.  How to be a Dictator: The Cult of Personality in the Twentieth Century. New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2019.   

Franz, Erica, Authoritarianism: What Everyone Needs to Know.  New York: Oxford University Press, 2018.

Friedrich, Carl and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski. Totalitarianism Dictatorship and Autocracy. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965.  

Glasius, Marlies. What authoritarianism is and is not: A practice perspective. International Affairs. 94. 515-533. 10.1093/ia/iiy060. 2018

Law, Diane. The Secret History of the Great Dictators. London: Magpie Books, 2006.

Kohn, Jerome. “Arendt’s Concept and Description of Totalitarianism.” Social Research 69, no. 2 (2002): 621–56. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40971564.

Levitsky, Steve and Lucan Way. Revolution and Dictatorship: The Violent Origins of Durable Authoritarianism. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2022.

Linz, Juan. Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes. Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner. 2000

Nisbet, Robert. Review of Arendt on Totalitarianism, by Hannah Arendt. The National Interest, no. 27 (1992): 85–91. http://www.jstor.org/stable/42896812.

Przeworski, Adam. “A Conceptual History of Political Regimes: Democracy, Dictatorship, and Authoritarianism.” New Authoritarianism: Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century, edited by Jerzy J. Wiatr, 1st ed., Verlag Barbara Budrich, 2019, pp. 17–36. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvdf08xx.5. Accessed 23 Oct. 2023.

Scruton, Robert. Dictionary of Political Thought. London: The MacMillan Press, 1982.

Stanley, Jason.  How Fascism Works: The Politics of Us and Them. New York: Random House, 2018.

Wiatr, Jerzy J. “Autocratic Leaders in Modern Times.” Political Leadership Between Democracy and Authoritarianism: Comparative and Historical Perspectives, 1st ed., Verlag Barbara Budrich, 2022, pp. 74–116. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv27tctmb.8. Accessed 23 Oct. 2023.

Authoritarian Practices: Introduction

We do not argue with those who disagree with us, we destroy them. Benito Mussolini

A growing number of astute political observers cite a global trend of authoritarianism since 1990. Countries like Russia, Turkey, India, Hungary and even the United States erode or effectively abolish democratic institutions and freedoms.  These observers – mainly scholars and journalists – situate authoritarianism in a historical context, often beginning with the Fascist leaders of the early 20th century – Italy’s Benito Mussolini and Nazi Germany’s Adolf Hitler and the Communist regimes of Stalin’s Russia and Mao Zedong in China. 

But what is authoritarianism?  How does it take hold of a polity?  How do authoritarian leaders gain and keep power?  Some people refer to these practices as an “Authoritarian playbook.” Of course, authoritarianism is not uniform. It varies in degrees of centralized power and brutality from Hitler and Stalin to Trump’s sustained efforts to erode democracy in the United States.  However, authoritarian leaders often borrow techniques from each other.  For instance, Hitler’s propaganda minister, Joseph Goebbels, travelled to Italy to study Mussolini’s methods to apply them to a rising Nazi Germany.  Donald Trump and his supporters echoed Victor Orban of Hungary’s conspiracy of billionaire George Soros as the leftist boogeyman and adapted Make Hungary Great Again to his MAGA mantra. As scholars like Ruth Ben-Ghiat and Jason Stanley point out, contemporary authoritarian tactics are not new but inspired by past authoritarian leaders.

Soviet Leader Josef Stalin

Over the next year, we will publish blogs on authoritarian practices that some call the Authoritarian Playbook.  All writings will focus on the broader context, beginning with the post-WWI years, to explore similarities and crucial differences. 

Here is the list of upcoming topics.  

  1. What is Authoritarianism?  Historical interpretations.
  2. The Authoritarian Playbook: An Overview of Authoritarian Tactics
  3. The National Myth (Mythical Past)
  4. Us vs. Them: Fostering Division and Repression
  5. Attacking the Truth: Eroding Facts and Media credibility
  6. Re-education. Undermining Intellectual Challenges
  7. Undermining Checks and Balances (e.g. Judiciaries)
  8. Cult of Personality – “The Strongman”
  9. Corrupters and Enablers
  10. Using Violence
  11. Resistance and Downfall

Stay tuned for our first blog on authoritarianism – What is Authoritarianism?  Historical interpretations.

Bibliography

Ben-Ghiat, Ruth. Strongmen, From Mussolini to the Present.  New York: W.W. Norton and Company Inc., 2020.

Davis, Kenneth. Strongman: The Rise and Fall of Democracy. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2020

Glasius, Marlies. (2018). What authoritarianism is and is not: A practice perspective. International Affairs. 94. 515-533. 10.1093/ia/iiy060.

Stanley, Jason.  How Fascism Works: The Politics of Us and Them. New York: Random House, 2018.

Russia 1905: A Dress Rehearsal for 1917 

 The beginning of the twentieth century forever changed the course of Russian history. Two revolutions occurred in Russia in 1917 – the February and October Revolutions.   The February Revolution toppled Tsar Nicholas II’s Russian monarchy and created a liberal-socialist Provisional government.  In October, Vladimir Lenin and the Bolshevik Party seized power and ushered in decades of communist rule in what became the Soviet Union until its collapse in 1989.  These events evolved from longstanding developments, including Russia’s revolution of 1905, which saw an unprecedented challenge to Tsarist authority that almost toppled the government.  It was the first time in Russia that the Tsarist government faced a revolt from virtually all levels of society, including the liberals middle class, the workers, and the peasantry. These revolts revealed a groundswell of discontent that grew out of drastic social changes, economic inequalities, and a Tsar determined to retain absolutism in the face of widespread calls for reform. Nicholas II quashed the rebellions and retained power, but these events laid the groundwork for 1917. As Lenin mused in 1920, 1905 was a dress rehearsal for 1917.  =

Tsar Nicholas II and Autocratic Rule in Russia. Tsars had ruled Russia since the 15th century and were considered divine right monarchs with unlimited power. Nicholas II inherited the throne in 1894 after his father, Alexanders II, passed.  Only 26, Nicholas II lacked his father’s vision, experience and fortitude.  Yet, the new Tsar believed he was entitled to rule as he wished and that his subjects were loyal to him even during widespread protest and dissent.  He preferred to blame dissension on “foreign elements,” particularly Jews, rather than address the underlying causes, such as poverty and poor working conditions. Like his father, Nicholas used his secret police and armed forces to suppress revolts.  However, this approach could not last as seismic social changes, encouraged by rapid economic growth, would increasingly challenge Tsarist rule. 

Tsar Nicholas II, Russia’s last Tsar from 1894-1917

Russia Industrializes. From the outside, Russia appeared to be an unstoppable power.  It possessed the world’s largest state territory, extending from Germany to China and Japan, and Europe’s largest population and army.  Russia also seemed set economically with abundant natural resources such as minerals and foodstuffs.  Culturally, Russia boasted the likes of Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, and Tchaikovsky as leaders in their respective arts. However, in many ways, Russia lagged behind European powers like England and France. The Crimean War (1854-56), which saw Russia lose to English and French expeditionary forces with superior navies and better weapons, highlighted Russia’s “backwardness.”

The loss inspired Russia to focus on industrialization.  Infused with foreign capital, Russia experienced large-scale industry growth as shops and largescale factories created products like textiles, printed materials and metalworks. By 1900, Russia had become the fourth largest steel producer and “turned out half of the world’s oil.” (Duiker, 15) Towns and cities like Moscow and St. Petersburg grew as they attracted people from the countryside seeking factory work.   Economic growth also required dependable transport. In the 1870s, Russia began developing an extensive rail network that facilitated the development of Russia’s mineral sector and the export of its grains to Western markets.  The vast Trans-Siberian railway linked Moscow to potential markets of the Far East – China, Manchuria, Korea and Japan.

Rapid Changes to Russian Society. Russia’s investment in industrialization and education fostered dramatic social changes destabilizing the regime. Industrialization led to increasing urbanization as more people moved to urban centres for work and school.  This urban migration altered class demographics, bolstering the numbers of industrial workers, commercial and industrial capitalists and the professional middle classes, including doctors, lawyers, and merchants.  State-sponsored basic education facilitated a rapid rise in literacy as universities arose in cities like Moscow and St. Petersburg. Historian Orlando Figes writes that “Between 1860 and 1914, the number of university students in Russia grew from 5000 to 69000.”(Figes, PT, 163)

Russia also experienced significant rural changes.  Serfdom ended in 1861, liberating serfs from the authority of manor lords from the noble class, but it did not drastically improve their plight. The new peasant class still laboured the land and now paid rent to the aristocracy through labour or money. Some still faced hunger and poverty with unpredictable growing seasons and minimal resources to manage agricultural setbacks. However, some peasants fared well “either by improving the agricultural productivity or by diversifying into non-agricultural activities.” (Hoskings, 358) The nobility retained a high status, occupying the highest posts in the military and government administrations and still owned vast lands. However, the end of serfdom eroded noble privilege.  Moreover, the new urban classes that benefitted from industrialization and urbanization eroded the nobility’s status.

Russian peasants in a rural village circa 1900

The Limits of Tsardom. Events such as the Famine Crisis of 1891 highlighted the limits of Tsarist authority and a need for a less centralized political structure. The 1891 famine, made worse by cholera and typhus, killed half a million people by the end of 1892. (PT, Figes, 159)The Russian government could not provide adequate relief and needed to solicit help from private groups to facilitate relief efforts. District councils known as Zemstvos orchestrated the distribution of food and medicine.  Such demonstrations of Tsarist limitations and social change fed calls for political reform. For his part, Nicholas II dismissed these demands as stemming from foreigners, revolutionaries and Jews who needed to be vigorously repressed.

Widespread Discontent. However, the problems lay far beyond the Tsar’s short-sighted explanations. Industrial growth benefited some more than others. In the cities, the growing working class resented the obvious income disparities. As historian Margaret MacMillan writes, “The magnates in Moscow and St. Petersburg lived in magnificent mansions and assembled great collections of art and furniture while the workers lived in squalor and laboured long hours in appalling conditions.” (176) Workers also had few legal protections that offered job security or promoted physical safety. Unions were illegal until 1905, so there were few options to express their grievances as unions. With limited options, it is unsurprising that labour discontent was “widespread in Russia’s industrial center for at least the preceding two decades” before 1905 (Snow, 7).

Russian workers in a textile factory.

Workplace culture was also evolving. As historian Neil Faulkner points out,  workplaces bred “the more determined of the proletarian militants into a political revolution, creating a new kind of Russian intelligentsia, one formed of self-taught intellectuals.” (49).  Since the Tsarist government tended to side with the industrialists against workers, the latter saw autocracy as a barrier to a better life. 

Tensions also grew in the countryside. Peasants were officially emancipated in 1861, but their situations remained generally dire. Emancipation still favoured the landlord. Nobility, gentry, and prosperous farmers retained two-thirds of the land, including most pastures and woodland.” (38). Peasants could not sell the land allotted to them, raise money by mortgaging it or renounce their entitlement. Consequently, they had to pay a kind of tax for many years to claim the property they might not have wanted. (Boyd 48) To make matters worse, the landed nobility often raised land rent beyond affordability, so many peasants fell into arrears and worked extra to compensate.  The more desperate committed petty crimes and looted prosperous landowners. Famines in 1892, 1898, and 1901 worsened their plight and led to peasant uprisings or jacqueries.

Meanwhile, a growing middle class in the cities intensified their demands for a greater political voice.  There were no political parties or parliament to address their concerns or aspirations.  The Tsar had created district councils or zemstvos to administer his agenda, but they did not impact national policies.  The zemstvos’ active role in famine relief and the Tsarist regime’s inadequacies encouraged them to seek constitutional reform, including limits to Tsarist authority.  Not surprisingly, Nicholas II would saw many zemstvos as potential havens of insurrection and “subjected them to a relentless campaign of persecution.” (PT, 164) 

 A growing number of students actively protested against Tsarist rule and policies. Urbanization and increasing literacy created a growing student population acquainted with the anti-autocratic ideas of western thinkers such as John Locke and Karl Marx, and Russia saw an upsurge in radicalism in the universities of St. Petersberg, Moscow, Warsaw and Kyiv.  Nicholas further antagonized students when he passed a decree in July 1899 that lifted military deferments for students guilty of political misconduct.  Predictably, as McMeekin writes, “many students who protested the decree were impressed into the army.” (McMeekin, 20)  In July 1904, Plehve, the Minister of the Interior, was “blown to pieces by a bomb planted by the SR Combat organization. 

Social Revolutionaries. Some Russians didn’t believe reforms went far enough and called for a revolution to create their vision of a better society.  These included the Social Revolutionary Party, which focused on supporting the peasants – 80% of Russia’s population as the revolution engine. Social Democrats, on the other hand, focused on the urban working class or proletariat.  By 1903 the Social Democrats would splinter/divide into the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. These groups played a more critical role in events leading to 1917 but did contribute to unrest in 1905.

The Russo-Japanese War 1903-1905.

Russia’s domestic problems were exacerbated by its foreign policy, particularly its efforts to expand into the Fat East.  Since 1860, when Tsar Alexander II founded a military base on the Pacific coast and dubbed it Vladivostok – meaning Lord of the East – Japan feared Russian encroachment and watched the construction of a Trans-Siberian mainland that couldtransport European arms on its borders (Boyd, 41).  Japan expressed its concerns to Russia, whose leaders saw the Japanese as an inferior non-European power impeding Russian growth and progress.

Japan decided to act. On February 8, Japan launched a surprise torpedo attack on the Russian naval squadron at Port Arthur. This pre-emptive attack occurred before Russia could send reinforcements for its Far Eastern forces. A series of defeats on land and sea would follow Russia’s initial setback.”(32 Fitzpatrick)   The Japanese forces proved more formidable, and Russia could not overcome the numerous logistical problems of fighting a war 6000 miles away. 

The defeat was humiliating and far-reaching.  Russia approached the peace table as the first European power to lose to an Asian foe in the imperialist era.  The war undermined Tsarist prestige and faith that Nicholas II could steer Russia in the right direction feeding the growing political unrest from all directions – students, workers, peasants, liberals and social revolutionaries.   An event in the first month of 1905 would spark widespread unrest and threaten to topple in Tsarist government.    

Bloody Sunday On Sunday, January 9, 1905, a crowd of almost 250,000 – workers and their families – approached the Tsar’s White Palace in St. Petersburg, intent on presenting Nicholas with a petition calling for political and economic reforms, including an eight-hour work day, the right to strike, civil liberties and a constituent assembly.   Unbeknownst to the protesters, the Tsar had already left the city.  As the unarmed peaceful protesters approached, Tsarist security forces panicked and fired on the crowd. More than a hundred protesters were killed or wounded in what became known as Bloody Sunday. 

Tsarist soldiers face protesters in front of the White Palace

The event triggered seismic outrage and sparked the 1905 revolution.  As William Duiker writes, it was a cataclysmic eruption of social disorder. (Duiker, 13).  Indeed, the event intensified dissent across Russia as “Wave upon wave of protest strikes rolled over the land….” (Lindemann, 159). Within a week, industrial workers across Russia were on strike. Revolutionary councils (soviets) sprang up in urban centers to help organize strikes that continued into the summer and the fall. Print workers protested in Moscow and St. Petersburg. Railroad workers went on strike a month later, paralyzing rail travel.  By the end of October, strikes had brought St. Petersburg “to its knees.” (Boyd, 58)  Revolts spread to the countryside with the 1905 Spring thaw peasants rose, refusing to pay rent, looting, seizing and burning estates.

However, these protests were generally disorganized. Tsarist forces readily quashed peasant uprisings village by village.  In the cities, they infiltrated and arrested organizers of worker strikes and student revolts.  As McMeekin writes, “So long as the army remained loyal, revolutionary schemes to topple the tsar remained little more than fanciful wish dreams.” (McMeekin 28)

Nonetheless, Russia’s government officials feared ongoing discontent that could eventually topple the regime and encouraged Nicholas II to make reforms. The Tsar resisted but finally conceded. Secretary of the Interior Witte publicly committed to drafting a proposal for a State Duma (Parliament), universal male suffrage, and fundamental civil liberties, including freedom of religion, assembly, speech, and association, to present to the Tsar for consideration.

The October Manifesto.  Nicholas agreed to what became known as the October Manifesto. The Manifesto legalized unions and political parties and established a nationally elected Parliament, the Duma. The Manifesto offered no solution to worker grievances, such as the eight-hour workday, respectful treatment by the employer, and better pay and conditions. (Figes, 33)  It would not be until the Tsar’s decrees of March 4, 1906, led to the legalization of strikes and worker’s unions.  For the peasantry, Tsar eased the peasantry’s redemption payments.

 Despite its limitations, the Manifesto was initially well received, with people celebrating the proclamation in the streets.” (Figes, 32)  However, this euphoria would be short-lived.  Tsarist actions would soon dispel hopes that Russia was en route to becoming a constitutional monarchy.  Nicholas II agreed to sign the Manifesto to appease a growing revolt rather than any conviction that he should share political power. Moreover, the defeat of the revolution proved to him that the Russian monarchy could triumph over adversity, that it was destined to lead Russia out of a time of trouble… (Wortman, 216)

Convinced of his righteousness and perceived need to weed out bad Russia’s harmful elements, Nicholas II resumed his suppression of those involved in the uprisings.  In December 1905, Nicholas II ordered the leaders of the St. Petersburg soviets arrested and put on trial for armed rebellion.” (Lindemann, 159). By 1906, the Tsar had curtailed the power of the Duma and fell back on the army and bureaucracy to rule Russians.” (Duiker, 15)

Conclusion. The 1905 Russian Revolution presented Russia’s Tsardom with a historically unprecedented challenge to its authority.  Members of all classes – workers, middle-class liberals, students, and peasants – protested Russia’s political system.  To stave off his usurpation, Nicholas II agreed to sign the October Manifesto that established Russia’s first Duma (Parliament) and offered long-demanded concessions, including the right to strike, legalizing unions, etc. Tsar also retained power because he retained the loyalty of the Russian Army and state police that could repress uprisings in the city and countryside.  

While the Tsar survived 1905, it was on borrowed time.  Widespread discontent would not wane as various classes continued to struggle. Nicholas II’s unwillingness to make meaningful reforms that would include more Russians in the political process lent credibility to the social revolutionaries who insisted that revolution was the answer.  With the added strains of the Frist World War (1914-1918), Russia toppled the Tsarist regime and embarked on a new path that would change the course of Russian and global history.     

Bibliography.

Ascher, Abraham. The Russian Revolution: A Beginner’s Guide. London: Oneworld Publications, 2014.

Faulkner, Neil. “The Revolutionaries.” A People’s History of the Russian Revolution, Pluto Press, 2017, pp. 27–51. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1k85dnw.9. Accessed 11 Jan. 2023.

Boyd, Douglas. Red October: The Revolution that Changed the World. Glouchester, The History Press, 2017.

Duiker, William J.  Twentieth-Century World History. Belmont, CA: Thomson Higher Education, 2007.

Figues, Orlando. Revolutionary Russia, 1891-1991: A History. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2014.

Fitzpatrick, Sheila. The Russian Revolution. Third Edition. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008

Hoskings, Geoffrey. Russia and Russians: A History. Boston: Harvard University Press, 2011

Hutchinson, John F. “Sovereignty as a Constitutional Issue in Imperial Russia, 1905-1915.” T. University of British Columbia, 1963.

Lindeman, Albert S. A History of Modern Europe From 1815 to the Present. West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013. 

Lindert, Peter H., and Steven Nafziger. “Russian Inequality on the Eve of Revolution.” The Journal of Economic History, vol. 74, no. 3, 2014, pp. 767–98. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24550511. Accessed 12 Jan. 2023.

MacMillan, Margaret. The War that Ended Peace: The Road to 1914. Toronto: Penguin Canada Books, 2013

The Bay of Pigs Invasion (1961) 

In April 1961, an American-sponsored contingent of 1500 Cuban exiles landed at the Bay of Pigs, intent on overthrowing Cuban leader Fidel Castro.  The attempt failed miserably.  Most invaders were captured and imprisoned.  The invasion further undermined U.S.-Cuban relations and heightened Cold War tensions, particularly Soviet-American relations.  It also stands as a conspicuous blemish on President Kennedy’s presidency. 

Historian Andrew Preston calls it the “biggest failure of his [Kennedy’s]  Presidency.” (89). Other scholars like John Rasenberger refer to the invasion as the “fiasco.” (xvii). What compelled the United States to organize and sponsor such an invasion? How did Cuban-American relations deteriorate to the point where Washington would risk political humiliation and cold war conflict to depose Fidel Castro?

Cuba and the United States

Some background history of Cuban-American relations helps us contextualize the Bay of Pigs invasion.  Cuba, located 90 miles south of Florida, had been a Spanish colony coveted for its natural resources – particularly sugar.  In 1808, Spain refused U.S. President Thomas Jefferson’s offer to purchase.  However, Spain was a declining power, and as Spanish influence receded from the Americas during the 19th century, the U.S. became increasingly involved in Cuba’s sugar, fruit, and molasses production.” (7)  In 1898, the United States defeated Spain and annexed Cuba as a colony. 

Washington promoted a Cuban resource-based economy dependent on US investments and buyers and sponsored successive Cuban governments who supported its broader Latin American policies. This arrangement continued throughout the 1950s as successive Eisenhower administrations backed Fulgencio Batista, the Cuban leader from 1952-1958.  A dictator, Batista fostered domestic discontent through corruption and repressing political opposition. Americans continued to control Cuban finances, rail, electricity, and sugar, while many Cubans lived in poverty and lacked access to education, healthcare and decent incomes.  

Cuban people resented Batista’s pandering to American commercial interests while callously ignoring Cuban people’s welfare.  

The groundswell of discontent fed Fidel Castro’s revolution that overthrew Batista in 1959. The new leader “nationalized” the economy by imposing widespread government controls. Castro also “invested in housing, schools and public works.  Salaries were raised, electric rates were cut, and rents reduced by half.” (Rodriguez, 25)

These changes reflected Castro’s goal of replacing an American-controlled Cuba with an independent regime.  On May 17, 1959, Cuba implemented the Agrarian Reform Law, which drastically reduced American ownership of Cuban land.  As Christina Fisanick points out, Castro’s reforms reduced American-controlled land from over 2 million to 1,000 acres.” (8). A charismatic speaker, Castro publicly identified as a revolutionary nationalist taking Cuba from imperialist America and giving it back to the Cuban people.  His actions backed his words.

Washington Responds

Not surprisingly, Washington did not welcome Castro’s rise to power or nationalist policies. Castro presented unprecedented challenges, at least in Latin America.  Historian Louis A. Perez Jr. writes that the most immediate was “the Cuban leader’s unprecedented and unrelenting condemnation of the United States for nearly sixty years of deeds and misdeeds in Cuba.” (229).  Some state officials dismissed Castro’s vitriol as the ravings of a mad dictator, while others saw him as a motivated communist.  Most seemed to settle on the latter explanation and framed Castro’s victory as a “Cold War problem.” 

Cold War

Washington’s assessment of Cuba grew out of the Cold War that evolved after World War Two (1939-1945) and centred on a global conflict between communism and democracy.  This bipolar view saw the Soviet Union leading the communists against the American-led democratic powers in a battle for international dominance.  While this paradigm didn’t give due justice to the complexities of the global environment, it still informed foreign policy. 

In 1947, only two years after the end of World War Two, the United States established the Truman Doctrine, which committed the U.S. to assist any country threatened by Communism. Washington showed further commitment by adopting the policy of “containment” that would compel American intervention in places like Korea, Vietnam, and Cuba, to stave the spread of communism. 

For his part, Castro denied being part of a global communist movement.  However, he turned to Moscow for economic and political support as Cuban-American relations deteriorated. Cuba signed a trade agreement with the Soviet Union in February 1960, and Moscow agreed to exchange the oil for sugar no longer purchased by the US.   By January 1961, Cuba established formal diplomatic ties with Moscow and “in early January 1961; the US terminated formal diplomatic relations with Cuba.” (Rodriguez, 26)

Washington saw Castro’s ties with Moscow as a serious threat to American security goals in the Americas and the world. Washington officials feared that the Cuban revolution offered the rest of Latin America an example that could undermine American hegemony in the region.  Eisenhower’s domino analogy now seemed applicable to Latin America. In a broader sense, Castro’s presence and aggressive reforms undermined American status at home and abroad.    As Perez Jr. writes, “if the United States could not contain the expansion of communism 90 miles from its shores, how could it be expected to resist communism in Europe, Asia, and Africa?” (239)

It can be argued that the American isolation of Castro and its history of exploiting the island and its people encouraged a nationalist revolution and an alliance with Moscow.  Some Americans acknowledged these factors, but regional security and Cold War priorities would prevail.  

Washington Plans

In his 1996 book, Confessions of a Cold Warrior, former CIA Deputy Director Richard Bissell writes that “A Communist government in Cuba, ninety miles from the US mainland, was unacceptable.” (Bissell, 152) Accordingly, American officials grappled with how to undermine Castro’s influence and, ultimately, oust him from power.  Some options were untenable. Washington dismissed calls for an open American military invasion of Cuba.  Such an overt act would escalate Soviet-American tensions and undermine Washington’s image as a promoter of freedom and self-determination. 

Instead, Washington chose political isolation, economic sanctions and covert sabotage.  As already mentioned, Washington set about isolating Castro diplomatically and economically by severing diplomatic relations and imposing a trade embargo on Cuba.  Besides these public tactics, President Eisenhower ordered the newfound Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to create a covert plan to invade Cuba by arming, training, and transporting anti-Castro exiles. Historian Raul Rodriguez writes that if all went to plan, “the invading exiles would be greeted as heroes when they landed” and “all private sector assets would be returned,” as a US friendly replaced an ousted Castro. (Rodriguez, 26).  

However, Eisenhower would not remain in power long enough to see the plan through. His second presidential term was coming to an end, so it would be up to his Vice-President Richard Nixon to win the upcoming election and deal with the Cuba problem.   In Nixon’s way stood a formidable political challenger.

John F. Kennedy. (1961-1963)

The 1960 U.S. presidential election saw Republican Richard Nixon pitted against up-and-comer Democratic Senator John F. Kennedy, and Cuba was one of the election’s main issues.  Kennedy campaigned on a hard stance against communism and criticized the Eisenhower government for being “soft” on Cuba.  The Democratic candidate went so far as to publicly insist that Castro be removed.  As historian Howard Jones points out, Nixon had to “remain silent on the invasion plan and thereby unable to counter his adversary’s charge that the administration was soft on Castro.” (Jones, 36).

Kennedy won the election and was inaugurated in 1961. He immediately set about making an impression as an action-oriented President.  By this time, Castro had been in power for a year and had implemented many changes to Cuba that Washington perceived as reflecting Communist ideals.  On January 28th, CIA Director Allen Dulles formally briefed Kennedy and his senior advisors, warning that “Castro was converting Cuba into a Communist state,” and detailed the American plan to topple Castro’s government. (Jones, 46)

Kennedy knew the plan held profound risks, and some of his senior advisors rigorously opposed it.  Chester Bowles and William Fulbright, for instance, both stressed “the invasion pitfalls,” including the potential impact on Soviet-American relations and Washington’s claim as a promoter of political self-determination. (Rasenberger, 394) However, a strong lobby of American officials wanted to follow through, and as historian Mark J. White points out, Kennedy’s campaign promises “delimited his policies as president.” (Fisanick, 10). Besides reneging on a campaign promise, White adds, “Cuba would have exposed him to Republican accusations of “softness” of communism.” (Fisanick, 10). In short, the new President’s public and private commitments to topple Castro compelled him forward.  Once he committed, a core challenge involved executing the invasion in a manner that disguised American involvement. 

Fallout.

The plan failed.  Most of the invading Cuban exiles were captured and imprisoned.  Some historians suggest that American air cover could have swayed the results, but Kennedy did not want to expose Washington’s involvement.  It didn’t work.  Despite the denials, the American government’s involvement was exposed.   Cuban-American relations continued to deteriorate as Soviet-Cuban ties strengthened.

Interestingly, the Bay of Pigs debacle did not deter Kennedy from Washington’s overarching Cold War agenda. After the invasion failed, President Kennedy reinforced the need to respond to communism.  As Rodriguez writes, “The lesson he drew from the Bay of Pigs was the need for escalated adventurism, not caution.” (Rodriguez, 27)

Historical Interpretations.

Historians continue to study the Bay of Pigs invasions to understand what happened and why.  Various interpretations abound, and new evidence offers opportunities for fresh insights.  Some scholars focus their criticism on the CIA, suggesting the agency pushed a misleading agenda on the President.  Others point to anti-communist fervour in Washington as the main culprit. In his excellent book, Brilliant Disaster: JFK, Castro, and America’s Doomed Invasion of Cuba’s Bay of Pigs (2011), John Rasenberger acknowledges Washington’s “nearly hysterical” approach to containing Communism while challenging claims that the CIA pulled the strings.   The Bay of Pigs, he writes, “was a collaboration of both Presidential administrations, numerous legislators and the CIA, who “either did know or should have known, what they were agreeing to.” (xv)

Recent scholarship pushes beyond the bounds of American foreign policy to explore the broader context of the Americas. Rodriquez and Trog, for instance, present the Cuban-American conflict as a “fundamental contradiction between Cuba’s revolutionary ferment in search of national realization and the US hegemonic quest for maintaining a status quo throughout the Western Hemisphere. (17)

The Bay of Pigs invasion fascinates us, and future studies will offer fresh and exciting insights. 

Bibliography

Bissell, Richard M. Reflections of a Cold Warrior: From Yalta to the Bay of Pigs. Neultaven, 1996.

Fisanick, Christina. Ed.   The Bay of Pigs.  Farmington Hills, MI: Greenhaven Press, 2004.

Friedman, Rebecca R. “Crisis Management at the Dead Center: The 1960-1961 Presidential Transition and the Bay of Pigs Fiasco.” Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol. 41, no. 2, 2011, pp. 307–33. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/23884834. Accessed 22 Aug. 2022.

Gleijeses, Piero. “Ships in the Night: The CIA, the White House and the Bay of Pigs.” Journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 27, no. 1, 1995, pp. 1–42. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/158201. Accessed 22 Aug. 2022.

Gott, Richard. Cuba: A New History. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004.

Jones, Howard. Bay of Pigs.  New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.  

Oakes, James.   Of the People: A History of the United States Since 1865. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017.

Pérez Jr., Louis A. “Fear and Loathing of Fidel Castro: Sources of US Policy toward Cuba.” Journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 34, no. 2, 2002, pp. 227–54. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3875788. Accessed 22 Aug. 2022.

Preston, Andrew. “Kennedy, the Cold War, and the National Security State.” in Andrew Hoberek ed. The Cambridge Companion to John F. Kennedy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015. 89-102. 

Rasenberger, Jim.  Brilliant Disaster: JFK, Castro, and America’s Doomed Invasion of Cuba’s Bay of Pigs. New York: Scribner, 2011.

Rodríguez, Raul and Harry Targ. “US Foreign Policy towards Cuba: Historical Roots, Traditional Explanations and Alternative Perspectives.” International Journal of Cuban Studies, vol. 7, no. 1, 2015, pp. 16–37. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.13169/intejcubastud.7.1.0016. Accessed 22 Aug. 2022.

Samson, Anna. “A History of the Soviet-Cuban Alliance (1960-1991).” Politeja, no. 10/2, 2008, pp. 89–108. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24919326. Accessed 22 Aug. 2022.

Stern, Sheldon M. The Week the World Stood: Inside the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005.

China’s Cultural Revolution (1966-1976)

From 1966 to 1976, Communist leader Mao Zedong led a “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” that renewed the Chinese Revolution that Mao felt had lost its way. Mao and his followers drastically altered the country’s political, economic, and social structure.   Historian Paul Clark calls it “the biggest non-wartime, concentrated social upheaval in world history. (1). Rhoads Murphey and Kirsten Stapleton describe it as “perhaps the great cataclysm in world history, measured by the hundreds of millions of people in mass persecution and suffering. (377).

During this period, Mao used strong imagery to promote himself as the “father” of the people and China as the world’s communist leader. By 1976, and after Mao’s death, moderates like Deng began to guide the country down a different path that invited economic incentives, western technology, education, and industrialization.

The Great Leap Forward and Soviet “revisionism.” A series of events leading to 1966 undermined Mao’s position in the Chinese Communist Party. First, his “Great Leap Forward” (beginning in 1958) was a disaster. Proclaiming that China would exceed British industrial production, Mao abolished private ownership and established communes throughout China to focus on manufacturing and bring industrialization to China’s rural areas. These peoples’ communes lacked organization and adequate equipment, expertise, and resources to succeed. Peasant resistance, administrative problems and bad weather also lead to unproductive food production. As many as 30 million starved or died from malnutrition in what Murphy and Stapleton describe as the “worst famine in world history.” (376). The program undermined Mao’s credibility and opened more opportunities to the moderate elements of the Communist Party, such as Lin Shaoquoi, who wanted to invite foreign technology and reinstate profit incentives.

Foreign developments also undermined Mao’s status. Mao had “portrayed Soviet policy-makers as ‘capitalist roaders’ and as betrayers of Marxism for seeking to cooperate with the West. (Rossabi, 386) The subsequent break with Moscow led to increasing political isolation and the withdrawal of much-needed Soviet technical support and economic assistance. In short, Mao’s zealous ideology furthered China’s isolation.   

Mao “revives” the revolution. Mao Zedong lost his position as head of state but somehow remained the most powerful and popular leader of the Communist party. He wanted to renew a revolution he felt had lost its vision and integrity. He insisted that China would fall into the complacency and Westernization he believed was happening in the Soviet Union without drastic changes. The Chinese revolution needed a revival.

Persecution. Supported by ideologically driven Party members and youth movements, Mao set about to “cleanse” Chinese society by targeting those deemed enemies of the campaign. The list of enemies proved long, but Mao and his supporters began with moderate party members like Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping (1904-1997). A Red Guard Student Brigade ridiculed and abused Mao’s political rivals such as Liu Shou (killed), Deng Xiaoping (imprisoned), and Zhou Enlai (driven to seclusion).  

Mao closed China’s schools and universities, labelling them as breeding grounds for rightist dissenters. Intellectuals, including writers, educators, and academics who criticized Party policies, were removed or detained, sentenced to forced manual labour or killed. Persecutors identified these targets as “rightists,” “enemies of the revolution,” or people of “bourgeoisie” inclination. In 1968, Zhou Enlai finally convinced Mao to bring in the army to suppress the Red Guards, many of whom felt betrayed by Mao, who had encouraged their radical actions. 

Mao’s Economic Revolution. Mao and his supporters altered the economy to reflect their ideological goals. They criticized Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiangping’s welcoming of foreign technology to grow the economy. Mao preferred to depend on labour rather than machinery and favoured the competence and dedication of the proletariat over capital investment in technology. In other words, China would achieve progress and prosperity through domestic efforts without foreign inspiration or assistance. Like the Great Leap Forward, rural communes produced mediocre and low-quality items such as iron, steel, and agricultural goods.  Once again, the economy faltered.

The Moderates Regain Power. By the 1970s, the revolution lost momentum, mainly under the weight of its extremism and archaic economic policies. The violence of the Red Guard and other groups had gone further than even Mao saw fit. People coveted stability. Not surprisingly, Mao’s economic policies did not revive the economy, and China seemed again immersed in a weakening economy inspired by ideology rather than practical guidance. 

The Cultural Revolution received its final blow when Mao died on September 9, 1976. Again, the moderates moved to consolidate control. One of the first steps was to purge the Gang of Four from the Party and sentence them to life imprisonment. Deng Xiaoping would lead the moderates to shift China away from Mao’s ideologically driven plan to a more pragmatic approach that blended modernization and capitalist ingenuity into the Party’s communist agenda.

In future blogs, we will take a closer look at various elements of the Cultural Revolution and the preceding Great Leap Forward. As always, feel welcome to contact us with ideas about future blog topics you would like to see.

Bibliography

Clark, Paul. The Chinese Cultural Revolution. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

Dikoter, Frank. The Cultural Revolution: A People’s History, 1962-1976. New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2016.

MacFaquahar, Roderick and Michael Schoenhals.  Mao’s Last Revolution.  Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2006.

Murphey, Rhoads and Kristen Stapleton. A History of Asia. Eighth Edition, New York: Routledge, 2019.

Rossabi, Morris. A History of China. West Sussex, Blackwell Publishing, 2014.

Germans and the Nazi Persecutions (1933-45): Coercion or Complicity?

Complicity. Partnership in a crime or wrongdoing.

Coercion. Persuade or restrain (an unwilling person) by force or threat of punishment.

Introduction. Adolf Hitler and the National Socialist Party gained power in 1933 and would govern Germany until the end of World War Two (1945). By 1934, his Nazi government had become a dictatorship, with Hitler as the Fuhrer. With bolstered state powers, they persecuted  “enemies of Germany,” such as Communist Party members, Social Democrats, and labour groups. Hitler also targeted those deemed unfit according to the Nazi racial hygiene agenda – people of colour, gypsies, criminals, the mentally and physically challenged and above all, Jews. The Nazis dismissed people from their jobs, confiscated property, locked people in prisons and concentration camps, sterilized the “unfit,” and executed millions. 

A Debate. How was it possible for the Nazis to persecute various groups – especially- Jews without significant resistance from German citizens? Many historians have addressed this question. Some scholars argue that German citizens complied with and supported and even initiated the persecution and slaughter of Jews and other groups. Others insist that most Germans disapproved of Nazi domestic persecution and terror but did not speak out for fear of Nazi retribution, including loss of property or career, imprisonment, and execution. 

Nazi Terror and Retribution. When Hitler and the National Socialist Party took power in 1933, they began centralizing control of Germany. According to Richard Evans, the main instrument of coercion was the law. The Nazis passed laws and decrees that broadened what constituted treason and people’s options for freedom of expression. For instance, it became legal to ridicule Hitler, to make derogatory remarks against the Nazi party, or to “discuss alternatives to the political status quo.” (Evans,101)  

Speaking out against Nazi policies or assisting the persecuted could result in severe retribution. In Why? Explaining the Holocaust (2017),  Peter Hayes points out that “overt assistance to Jews constituted sabotage punishable by death”  and cites the example of Nazi Anton Schmidt, who facilitated the escape of at least 100 Jews after witnessing the execution of Jewish infants. After being exposed, he was court-martialed and executed. (145-146).   

Surveillance and intimidation proved effective deterrents to dissent. The Nazi secret police (Gestapo) did not have many men at their disposal but still “infiltrated people’s lives – directly, indirectly and psychologically.”  (Childress, 319).   Gestapo agents performed late-night arrests and interrogations. Germans were encouraged to report transgressions of Nazi law by their peers, neighbours and even family. Those charged faced a dubious legal process through what Richard Evans describes as a “whole system of regional Special Courts, crowned by the National People’s Court, the Volkgerichlen, was created to implement these and similar laws. (Evans, 101)

These historians argue that the Nazis organized an effective program of intimidation and coercion that effectively discouraged Germans from resisting the Nazi racial hygiene program.  

Citizen Complicity. Other scholars believe such interpretations overstate the extent of Nazi control while neglecting the willingness of German citizens to facilitate and even initiate the persecutions. In Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust (1997), Daniel Goldhagen acknowledges Nazi government coercion but argues that the main driving force behind the Holocaust was deep-seated, specifically German antisemitism.  

Goldhagen relates a story about Captain Wolfgang Hoffman, “a zealous executioner of Jews” who led “ordinary men” to slaughter tens of thousands of Jews in Poland. (3). Hoffman, he points out, refused to sign a declaration that his group would not plunder and steal from the persecuted Jews. Why did he refuse? Hoffman took offence that he and the men under his charge would steal. Besides the irony that Hoffman enthusiastically killed people, Goldhagen points out that Hoffman was not punished for refusing a direct order. In order words, Hoffman had a choice. By extension, his persecution of Jews came not from fear of retribution but from personal conviction—a willing executioner. 

Goldhagen goes on to argue that historians have focused on the leaders of the Nazi regime while neglecting people like Hoffman who facilitated the execution not from fear of Nazi retribution but out of a conviction that stemmed from “a particular type of antisemitism that led them to conclude that the Jews ought to die.”

Goldhagen’s thesis hinges on pervasive  German-specific antisemitism – a point of controversy among historians.   In Hitler and the Holocaust (2001), Robert S. Wistrich argues that Goldhagen overstates the role of German eliminationist antisemitism in the Holocaust. Germans certainly facilitated the killings, but this didn’t stem from a longstanding eliminationist mindset in the mid 19th century. Before Hitler, Wistrich argues, “racist antisemitism had not made great inroads in Germany” and was “still a state based on the rule of law, where Jews achieved remarkable economic success, were well integrated into society, and enjoyed equal rights.” (4)  

Selective Nazi Terror. In Nazi Terror: The Gestapo, Jews and Ordinary Germans (1999), Eric Johnson agrees with Goldhagen that many ordinary Germans willingly facilitated terror campaigns, persecutions and genocide. He also acknowledges the role of Nazi coercion but disagrees with Evans on the extent of Nazi coercion. He argues that Hitler’s government did not terrorize most Germans but instead focused the terror against “enemies of the state” – especially Jews. Most German citizens were not directly impacted by Nazi terror and “enjoyed considerable space to vent their everyday frustration with Nazi policies and leaders without inordinate fear of arrest or prosecution. (19)

Richard Evans disagrees with Johnson’s presentation of selective Nazi coercion and persecution. Nazi violence focused more on particular groups but “operated across the board.”(199). In 1933-4, for instance, the Nazis targeted the political leaders of the Social Democratic and Communist parties, such as Social Democrat Johann Steller, who “was tortured to death. (93).   Together, Evans notes, “the Social Democrats and Communists had won 131 million votes in the Reichstag election of 1932.” (94). “Hardly,” he points out, “members of a despised minority of social outcasts.”(94)

Self Interest and Opportunism Another historian who does not see antisemitism as the main factor in Holocaust is Joseph D. Bendersky. In A Concise History of Nazi Germany (2014), Bendersky argues that “the Jewish question had not been important to most German” who were more concerned with “moral degeneracy, crime, political subversion, and public order.” (139). Accordingly, the persecution of Communists, sexual deviants, and violent criminals received public support. He places more weight on other factors, including economic self-interest and the “terror of the police state.” (141)  Regarding self-interest, Bendersky notes how although a “Large segment” of German were shocked by Nazi violence, many opportunistically filled the Jewish vacancies in various professions, civil service positions, and businesses as Nazis pushed Jews out of their jobs. “Profit at the expense of the Jews was a temptation too many could not resist.” (139). Like Evans and Hayes, he adds that the Nazi use of terror deterred resistance and many who persisted paid the price. “Countless individuals,” Bendersky writes, paid with their lives for speaking out or for attempting to save others from Nazi tyranny. (141)

Conclusion. The role of German citizens in Nazi persecution, and particularly the Holocaust, remains a contentious topic and one that scholars will grapple with for many years to come. Hitler’s Nazi regime indeed used terror and reward to encourage German complicity. Some Germans, of course, engaged in the persecutions of “German enemies” with horrific enthusiasm. The longstanding question remains. Which factored more, coercion or complicity?

Bibliography

Aly Gotz, Peter Chrousti and Christine Ross. Cleansing the Fatherland: Nazi Medicine and Racial Hygiene. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994.

Barnet, Victoria J. Bystander: Conscience and Complicity During the Holocaust. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999

Bendersky, Joseph W. A Concise History of Nazi Germany. New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2014.

Benz, Wolfgang. A Concise History of the Third Reich. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006

Bergen, Doris L.  Twisted Cross. The German Christian Movement in the Third Reich. Chapel Hill, 1996.

Childress, Thomas. The Third Reich. A History of Nazi Germany. New York: Simon Shuster, 2017.

Marc Dewey, Udo Schagen, Wolfgang U. Eckart & Eva Schoenenberger, “Ernst Ferdinand Sauerbruch and His Ambiguous Role in the Period of National Socialism”, in Annals of Surgery 244 (2006), pp. 315- 321.

Friedlander, Saul. Nazi Germany and the Jews, Vol. 1 The Years of Persecution, 1933-1939. New York: 1997.

Goldhagen, Daniel Jonah.  Hitler’s Willing Executioners. Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust. New York: Random House Inc., 1997.  

Hamerow, Theodore S. On the Road to the Wolf’s Lair. German Resistance to Hitler. London, 1999

Hayes, Peter. Why? Explaining the Holocaust. New York: W.W. Norton Inc. 2017.

Johnson, Eric A. Nazi Terror: The Gestapo, Jews, and Ordinary Germans. New York: Basic Books, 1999.

Lifton, Robert J. The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide. New York, 1986.

Kershaw, Ian. The Nazi Dictators: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation. (London, 1993).

Proctor, Robert N. Racial Hygiene: Medicine Under the Nazis. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1998. 

Schmidt. U.H. Karl Brandt: The Nazi Doctor. New York: Continuum, 2007

Shirer, William. The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. New York: Simon and Shuster, 1960.

Stern, Fritz. Five Germans I have Known. New York: Farar, Straus, and Giroux, 2006. 

Thomas, Gordon and Gary Lewis. Defying Hitler: The German Who Resisted Nazi Rule. New York: Random House, 2019. 

Wistrich, Robert S. Hitler and the Holocaust. London, The Orion Publishing Group, 2001. 

Wistrich, Robert. Who’s Who in Nazi Germany. London, 1995.

Eugenics: An Introduction

Eugenics. The science of improving the population by controlled breeding for desirable inherited traits. From the Greek eugenes, meaning well-born.

Animal Husbandry.  The science of breeding.

In 1883, Francis Galton, first cousin to Charles Darwin, coined “eugenics”, a pseudoscience that advocated controlled reproduction to ensure the healthy evolution of human societies.  Eugenics became increasingly popular in the early 20th century, solidifying racial hierarchies and categories of the unfit – criminals, the mentally ill, and the feebleminded.  Programs in various countries encouraged the “fit” to reproduce while discouraging the unfit through measures ranging from segregation to elimination.

Francis Galton (1822-1911) Francis Galton grew up in England and inherited a significant fortune after his father died.  His extensive travels to places like Africa reinforced his sense of a rigid hierarchy of human categories.  He was not alone in this thinking as racial and ethnic determinism pervaded Western thought during the 19th century.  Darwin’s publication of the Origin of Species (1859) further inspired Galton to pursue social betterment through selective breeding. Galton believed that humans evolved through the natural selection of inborn traits, and parents transmitted intellectual and moral qualities to their children. He acknowledged social factors but insisted that inherited talent (or lack of) persevered.  

Turn of the Century:  Eugenics takes off. Various factors played into eugenics growing popularity into the 20th century.  The “rediscovery” of Gregor Mendel’s claims of heredity as the dominant determinant in human life bolstered eugenic claims of biological determinism.  Visible signs of poverty, crime, and mental illness accompanied urban growth evoked concerns about societal “degeneration” – an oft-used term at the time.  As Diane B. Paul writes, “Middle-class people of every political persuasion – conservatives, liberals, and socialists, were alarmed by the apparent profligate breeding of what in Britain was called the “social residue.” (Paul, 235)

Alarmed by these developments and confident in their theories of selective reproduction, eugenics advocates began implementing practices to realize their visions.  Scholars have identified these practices as “positive” and “negative” eugenics. 

Positive Eugenics. Positive eugenics involved the promotion and practice of the selective breeding of the “fit.”  He pointed to the example of animal husbandry as a model to follow.  “If a twentieth part of the cost and pains,” he said, “were spent in measures for the improvement of the human race that is spent on the improvement of the breeding of horses and cattle, what a galaxy of geniuses might we create!  (Larson 180).

Negative Eugenics in Practice. The early focus on positive eugenics would give way to prohibitive measures in the twentieth century.  In the United States, Canada, and much of Northern Europe, as well as Britain, the central question was how best to discourage breeding by moral and mental defectives.” (Crook, 235)  The practice of eugenics ranged from segregation to extermination.  Practices also varied over time and from country to country.  Generally, the initial approach involved the segregation of male and female “defectives”. Some feared another option, sterilization, would promote images of extremism—however, institutional expenses coupled with improved sterilization technology made this alternative a more popular choice.  Accordingly, governments legalized the practice. Sterilization laws, for instance, had been passed in 30 American states and 3 Canadian provinces. (Paul, 236) 

Not surprisingly, the worst expression of eugenics occurred in Nazi Germany.  The Aktion T-4 programme and subsequent programs “euthanized” up to 200,000 of the country’s institutionalized mentally and physically disabled, some with the tacit consent of the families. (Paul, 236)  

Opposition.  Predicably, eugenics attracted virulent opposition from the Catholic Church, labour groups, liberal politicians, and scientific community members. The Catholic Church, already opposed to abortion and contraception, vehemently opposed sterilization. Labour groups spoke out against eugenics, knowing that many working and lower classes, especially immigrants, fell into eugenic categories of unfit.  Scientists readily challenged eugenic claims and the Mendelian foundation by highlighting the nurture side of the nature vs nurture debates of the time. 

Conclusion.  Blatant Nazi atrocities in the name of racial hygiene, coupled with scientific exposures of its falsities, undermined eugenic claims.  However, it did become one of the most influential and devastating of the broader social Darwinist movement.

This blog offers a rudimentary introduction to eugenics.  Future blogs will address more specific aspects of this topic.

Selected Bibliography

Cowan, Ruth Schwartz. Francis Galton and the Study of Heredity in the Nineteenth Century. New York: Garland, 1985.

Crook, Paul. Darwin’s Coat-Tails: Essays on Social Darwinism.  New York: Peter Lang Publishing Inc., 2007.

Larson, Edward J.  Evolution: The Remarkable History of a Scientific Theory.  New York: Modern Library, 2006. .

Paul, Diane B. “Darwin, Social Darwinism, and Eugenics.”  Jonathan Hodge and Gregory Radick eds.  The Cambridge Companion to Darwin.  New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009

World War 1 Begins

The Great War, also later known as World War 1, began in 1914 as a European conflict between the major powers and spread to almost all European states except Switzerland, Norway, Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands and Spain.  Countries outside of Europe like Canada, the United States, New Zealand, Japan, and India joined the fray, usually due to political obligations or strategic concerns.  Many believed the war would be short-lived. Fighting, however, lasted until 1918, taking many lives and forever changing the global landscape.

How did the war begin? The origins of the conflict are complex and contentious.  Historians have cited numerous causes, including the Alliance System, nationalism, imperialism and militarism. As eminent historian Jacques Barzun pointed out, “No conclusion has been agreed upon.” (68). We will explore the causes and other topics of The Great War in other blogs.  For now, we will focus on the events leading to war. 

European Alliances and Rivalries The alliance system refers to the two opposing camps that entered the war in 1914 after a series of war declarations.  On one side, the Triple Alliance comprised Germany, Italy, and Austria-Hungary.  The other, the Triple Entente, included France, Great Britain and Russia. These alliances reflected a “strength in numbers” approach to security.    

All of the countries had reasons to ally. France feared a Germany that, since its unification in 1870, became a formidable economic and military power, in part at France’s expense. During the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1), Prussia defeated France, annexed Alsace-Lorrain, and made France pay reparations.  An invigorated Germany bolstered its military power and, through French eyes, remained the primary threat.  Britain and Russia agreed.  Germany’s military growth, particularly its Navy, threatened Britain’s traditional naval hegemony.  Russia, still recovering from their 1905 loss to Japan and reeling from an internal revolution, saw a growing Germany as a threat to Russia’s western border.   

Germany, of course, had its concerns.  With France and Russia on its west and east borders, Germany stood pinned between two powers. Berlin met this challenge in two ways. First, in 1880, German Chancellor Otto Von Bismark solicited Austro-Hungary and Italy to create a Triple Alliance. Second, they adopted the Schlieffen Plan – an offensive strategy where Germany would attack France first in the hope of defeating them before Russia mobilized – in what they estimated to be forty-two days. (Storey, 21-22) 

Berlin’s primary ally, Austria-Hungary, included a significant German population and coveted a solid supporter to back it against Balkan uprisings, particularly from Serbia.  Italy, less enthusiastic about allied commitments, would not enter the war until 1915 – alongside the Triple Entente of Britain, France, and Russia! Neither Russia nor France matched Germany’s economy or military, but together they offered a viable threat.  Neither Berlin nor Vienna wanted to stand alone. 

So, how did these countries come to war?

The Balkans – Instability Spreads. As William Kelleher Storey writes, the war  “was touched off by a crisis over nationalist aspirations in the Balkans,” a region of unrest and instability. (29)  The Ottoman Empire once controlled the Balkan Peninsula but, after a steady decline, relinquished control of the region that broke into several countries  – Serbia, Bulgaria, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Romania, Montenegro and Greece.   Competing nationalities and religions exacerbated political divisions and lead to perpetual struggles for regional control and independence, leading to many local conflicts and longstanding hostilities.

Serbia became the peninsula’s dominant country and took center stage leading to the Great War. Serbia gained independence from a weakening Ottoman Empire in 1878 and coveted a Greater Serbia.  Austria-Hungary feared Serbian nationalist fervour might encourage the southern Slavic population in Austro-Hungary to separate and join Serbia. 

On the other hand, Russia coveted a strong Serbia as a base of influence in the Balkans and Constantinople and the Dardanelles that would link the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.   These ambitions, coupled with its Slavic heritage, lead Russa to offer itself as sponsor and protector of the Slavs in the Balkans, particularly Serbia.  

Vienna’s annexation of Bosnia and its significant Serbian population in 1908 widened the rift between Austria-Hungary and Serbia.  Russia, still recovering from its 1905 loss to Japan and warned off by Germany, did not intervene, undermining its status as Slavic protector.  As tension grew between Serbia and Austria-Hungary, it seemed more likely that regional strife would spill over into the rest of Europe.  All that was needed was a catalyst – that occurred on July 14th, 1914. 

The Catalyst. On July 14th, 1914, Serbian nationalist Gavril Princip assassinated Austro-Hungary’s Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife- shooting them both in the car as they toured the streets of Sarajevo.   Emboldened by German support, Austria issued an ultimatum to Serbia that would effectively deny Serbian independence.  Serbia accepted all but one of the demands.  Seeing an opportunity to deal with the “Serbia problem,” Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia on July 28th.  

The entangled alliances and competing interests encouraged a series of Great Power decisions that lead to a much broader conflict.  Here is a very simplified sequence of events. Russia, supporting Slavic Serbia and protecting its influence in the Balkans, declared war on Austria-Hungary and mobilized its forces.  Germany, alarmed by Russian mobilization and in support of Vienna, declared war on Russia then France.  Germany’s attack plan on France required them to cross Belgium, a neutral country.  This action leads to Britain, obligated to protect Belgian neutrality, to declare war on Germany.  Now, the prominent European nations were at war, and soon, soldiers from around the world would join the fray. 

Conclusion. Could the war have been averted?  Some historians insist that the alliance system meant that one declaration of war leads to the diplomatic equivalent of dominoes falling.  Others maintain that leaders could have made different choices and averted war.  These are discussions for future blogs.  Historians, however, do agree that World War 1, drastically changed Europe and the world. 

Selected Bibliography

Barzun, Jacques.  From Dawn to Decadence, 1500 to the Present: 500 Years of Western Cultural Life.  New York: Harper Collins, 2000.

Black, Jeremy.  The Great War and the Making of the Modern World.  London: Continuum International Public Group, 2011. 

Davies, Norman. Europe: A History.  London: Oxford University Press, 1997. 

Ferguson, Neill.  The War of the World Twentieth Century and Descent of the West.  Penguin Books, 2006. 

Meyer, G.T. A World Undone: The Story of the Great War, 1914-1918.  New York: Bantam Dell, 2006. 

Roberts, J.M.  The Penguin History of the World.  New York: Penguin Books, 1987.

Storey, William Kelleher.  The First World War.  London: Rowman and Littlefield, 2014.